Chapter 3
Psychoanalytic Approaches to Personality

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Perhaps the greatest challenge in trying to summarize the state of psychoanalysis as a theory of personality roughly a century after its inception is to delineate precisely what one means by “psychoanalysis.” Sixty years ago, such a definition would have been relatively clear. Psychoanalysis was a well-guarded fortress, and most psychologists had little interest in scaling its walls. The password to enter was relatively unambiguous: Those who considered themselves psychoanalytic believed in the importance of unconscious processes, conflicts and defenses, the Oedipus complex, and the centrality of the sexual drive in the development of personality and neurosis; those who did not consider themselves psychoanalytic believed in none of these things.

Psychologists who were caught in the moat—who accepted some of Freud’s premises but rejected aspects of theory important to him, such as the centrality of sexuality or the Oedipus complex—would by and large depart the stronghold or be cast out as heretics, and their work would never be cited again in psychoanalytic literature. This ragtag army of the not-quite-analytic-enough came to be identified under the broader rubric of “psychodynamic,” which included those who believe in the importance of unconscious processes and conflicting forces within the mind but do not necessarily hold to the theory of libido and the pre-eminence of the Oedipus complex.

As we will see, the distinction between psychodynamic and psychoanalytic has virtually disappeared since the 1980s, as previously “forbidden” ideas have entered the pale, and as mainstream psychoanalytic theorists and clinicians have come to reject many of the propositions that Freud considered defining of the approach to the mind he created, notably the centrality of the Oedipus complex and the sexual drive—or the concept of drive at all. Today most of the major psychoanalytic journals publish papers from radically differing theoretical perspectives, including object relations theory, self psychology, relational perspectives, constructivist perspectives, and various postmodern views, many of which would have been anathema to Freud. Hence the use of the plural in the title of this chapter, “Psychoanalytic Approaches to Personality,” reflecting the pluralism that charac-
characterizes contemporary psychoanalysis (Hamilton, 1996; Wallerstein, 1988).

Psychoanalysis has thus become less easy to define because its boundaries are more permeable. Perspectives that would at one time have been relegated to the wider ranks of the psychodynamic, such as more interpersonal approaches, are now part of mainstream psychoanalytic literature. Another factor rendering psychoanalytic approaches less distinct is that contemporary psychology has come to accept many of the postulates that once clearly demarcated psychoanalysis from other points of view. The cognitive revolution ushered in an interest in mental events, which had been largely extinguished by the behaviorists (with occasional spontaneous recoveries). Of particular importance is the burgeoning literature on unconscious processes (called "implicit processes," largely to ward off any association with the Freudian unconscious) in cognitive and social psychology. This development began with implicit memory and cognition (Bowers & Mischel, 1984; Kihlstrom, 1987; Schacter, 1992) but has begun to spread, as we predicted in the first edition of this handbook (Westen, 1990a), to the realms of affect and motivation as well. Indeed, the fall of the "Berlin Wall" between psychology and psychoanalysis actually may have occurred without fanfare in 1987 when E. Tory Higgins and Jonathan Bargh, two leading experimental social psychologists, criticized exclusive reliance on the "faulty computer" metaphor for explaining errors in social cognition, and called instead for a conception of mental processes that would have been familiar to Freud and certainly to contemporary psychoanalytic theorists and clinicians:

It may be that people are not motivated solely to be accurate or correct. Indeed, people are likely to have multiple and conflicting motivations when processing information such that not all of them can be fully satisfied... If one abandons this assumption [that people are motivated to be accurate], then an alternative perspective of people as "creatures of compromise" may be considered, a perspective suggesting that people's judgments and inferences must be understood in terms of the competing motivations that they are trying to satisfy. (Higgins & Bargh, 1987, p. 414)

Although substantial differences remain between the views of psychologists and psychoanalytic theorists, the differences are now more subtle, so that mutual dismissal and sling of epithets require considerably more finesse than was once the case.

What, then, is a psychoanalytic approach? Freud (1923/1961) defined psychoanalysis as (1) a theory of the mind or personality, (2) a method of investigation of unconscious processes, and (3) a method of treatment. In this discussion, we focus on psychoanalysis as a theory of personality, although discussions of method and treatment invariably arise because much of the evidence for psychoanalytic theory has stemmed from its distinct methods of inquiry and because clinical observation has been the basis of most of the evolution in psychoanalytic theory—something we believe is changing, a point to which we will return.

At this writing, psychoanalytic perspectives on personality are probably best categorized prototypically rather than through any particular set of defining features. Psychoanalytic approaches are those that take as axiomatic the importance of unconscious cognitive, affective, and motivational processes; conflicting mental processes; compromises among competing psychological tendencies that may be negotiated unconsciously; defense and self-deception; the influence of the past on current functioning; the enduring effects of interpersonal patterns laid down in childhood; and the role of sexual, aggressive, and other wishes and fears (such as the need for self-esteem and the need for relatedness to others) in consciously and unconsciously influencing thought, feeling, and behavior. The degree to which an approach matches this prototype is the degree to which it can be considered psychoanalytic.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section provides a brief discussion of the evolution of psychoanalytic theory. The next section turns to current issues and controversies in psychoanalysis, focusing on two central issues of particular relevance to personality theory: the nature of motivation, and how we know when we understand a person. The third section addresses the enduring contributions of psychoanalysis to the study of personality. The fourth section describes emerging points of contact and integration with other areas of psychology, focusing on efforts to integrate psychodynamic thinking with research in cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary psychology. The final section suggests directions for the future.
THE EVOLUTION OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY

Freud's models of the mind, and the early revisionist theories of Adler, Jung, and the neo-Freudians, should be well known to readers of this volume and hence are described only briefly here. Freud developed a series of models and theories that he never attempted to integrate fully. Freud's psychological theorizing was, however, from the start guided by his interest and his database. He was interested first and foremost in understanding psychopathology, and his primary data were the things that patients wittingly and unwittingly told about themselves in clinical hours. Of the greatest importance methodologically were free associations (which held the promise of revealing associational networks and mental transformations of ideas and feelings) and transference phenomena (in which patients revealed interpersonal cognitive-affective-behavioral patterns that the analyst could observe directly).

Fundamental to Freud's thinking about the mind was a simple assumption: If there is a discontinuity in consciousness—something the person is not doing but cannot report or explain—then the relevant mental processes necessary to “fill in the gaps” must be unconscious (see Rapaport, 1944/1967). This deceptively simple assumption was at once both brilliant and controversial. Freud was led to this assumption by patients, first described in the Studies on Hysteria (Breuer & Freud, 1893–1895/1955), who had symptoms with no organic origin. The patients were making every conscious effort to stop these symptoms but could not. Freud's logic was simple: If the “force” behind the symptom is psychological but not conscious, that leaves only one possible explanation: The source of the symptom must be unconscious. Opposing the conscious will, Freud reasoned, must be an unconscious counterwill of equal or greater magnitude; the interplay of these forces was what he described as “psychodynamics.” (See Erdeleyi, 1985, for a vivid and readable account of Freud’s discovery of psychodynamics.)

The Drive-Instinct and Energy Models

From his early publications onward, Freud was concerned with the nature of human motivation, and he attempted to bring together a psychological theory of adaptive and maladaptive mental processes with mechanistic and materialist conceptions of psychic energy, instinct, and drive rooted in the scientific thinking of his age (see Sulloway, 1979). His drive instinct and energy models, which for our purposes we largely describe as a single model (though see Compton, 1981a, 1981b; Rapaport & Gill, 1959), evolved throughout his career, but always preserved their emphasis on (1) the conservation of psychic energy, and (2) the biological and animal origins of human motivation. Freud assumed that mental processes must be powered by energy, and that this energy must follow the same laws as other forms of energy in nature. A psychological motive to which energy has been attached can be consciously or unconsciously suppressed, but it cannot be destroyed. The act of suppression will itself require expenditure of energy, and the motive, if fueled by enough force, will likely be expressed by conversion to another form no longer under conscious control, such as a symptom, a dream, a joke, a slip of the tongue, behavior, ideology—the possible outlets are boundless.

Freud also argued that basic human motivations are little different from those of other animals. The major differences between humans and animals in this respect stem from (1) social requirements for inhibition of impulses in humans; (2) the capacity of humans to express their motives in symbolic and derivative forms; and (3) the greater capacity of humans either to ob-
tain or to inhibit their desires, based on their capacity to adapt to their environment. Freud was dualistic in his instinct theory throughout much of his career, first juxtaposing self-preservation and preservation of the species (through sex) as the two basic motives (e.g., Freud, 1914/1957), and later asserting that sex and aggression are the basic human instincts from which all other motives ultimately flow. Freud's notion of the sexual drive, or libido, is broader than common usage of the term, and is similar to its Platonic prototype. For Plato, Eros is a rich and malleable kind of desire, which has both relatively physical and sublime expressions. Likewise, libido, for Freud, refers as much to pleasure seeking, sensuality, and love as it does to sexual desire.

Ultimately Freud came to view life as a struggle between life and death instincts, although this was Freud at his most metaphysical, and "classical" analysts today tend to equate drive theory with Freud's dual instinct theory of sex and aggression (e.g., Brenner, 1982). Perhaps what is most compelling about Freud's instinct theory is the notion that certain motives are simply rooted in the organism, and that there is nothing people can do but to try to adapt to them, enjoy them or inhibit them when appropriate, and extrude them from their experience of self when they are too threatening to acknowledge as their own.

The Developmental Model

Although Freud's drive theory was dualistic, his primary focus was on the sexual drive, which he at times equated more generally with psychic energy. In his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905/1953b), in which he articulated his developmental or "genetic" model (as in genesis, not behavioral genetics), he argued that the development of personality could be understood in terms of the vicissitudes of the sexual drive (broadly understood). From this springs his argument that stages in the development of libido are psychosexual stages—that is, stages in the development of both sexuality and personality.

Freud's psychosexual stages represent the child's evolving quest for pleasure and realization of the limitations of pleasure seeking. According to Freud, a drive has a source (a body zone), an aim (discharge), and an object (something with which to satisfy it). The sources or body zones on which libido is centered at different periods follow a timetable that is biologically determined, although the various modes of pleasure seeking associated with these zones have profound social implications as well. Freud's stages should be understood both concretely and metaphorically: They relate to specific bodily experiences, but these experiences are viewed as exemplars of larger psychological and psychosocial conflicts and concerns (see Erikson's [1963] elaborations of Freud's developmental theory).

In the oral stage, the child explores the world with its mouth, experiences considerable gratification and connection with people through its mouth, and exists in a state of dependency. The anal stage is characterized by the child's discovery that the anus can be a source of pleasurable excitation; by conflicts with socialization agents over compliance and defiance (the "terrible twos"), which Freud described in terms of conflicts over toilet training; and by the formation of attitudes toward order and disorder, giving and withholding, and messiness and cleanliness. The phallic stage is characterized by the child's discovery of the genitals and masturbation, an expanding social network, identification (particularly with same-sex parents), oedipal conflicts, and the castration complex in boys and penis envy in girls. In the latency stage, sexual impulses undergo repression, and the child continues to identify with significant others and to learn culturally acceptable sublimations of sex and aggression. Finally, in the genital stage, conscious sexuality resurfaces, genital sex becomes the primary end of sexual activity, and the person becomes capable of mature relatedness to others.

These are among Freud's most controversial formulations, some of which are no longer central to contemporary psychoanalytic thinking. The extent to which one finds them credible depends in part upon whether one has observed such phenomena in a clinical or child care setting and how literally or metaphorically one chooses to take them. That little children masturbate or can be coy or competitive with their parents is manifestly obvious to anyone who has spent time with young children. For example, a friend's 3-year-old announced at the dinner table, "Daddy, I'm going to eat you up so I can have Mommy all to myself!" Experimental evidence provides surprising support for some of Freud's more classical psychosexual hypotheses as well, such as the Oedipus complex (see Fisher & Greenberg, 1996; Westen, 1998a).

Many of Freud's psychosexual hypotheses have not, however, fared as well, and are better understood metaphorically or discarded alto-
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...gether. On the other hand, knowing which ones
to discard is not always an easy task. Freud’s con-
cept of penis envy, seemingly his most outland-
ish and gender-biased concept, provides a good
example. Freud had a tendency to generalize
from small and unrepresentative samples, but he
was not simply inventing concepts off the top of
his head without basis in clinical data. At its
most metaphorical, penis envy can refer to the
envy developed by a little girl in a society in
which men’s activities seem more interesting and
valued (see Horney, 1967). Given the concrete-
ness of childhood cognition, it would not be sur-
prising if a 5-year-old symbolized this in terms
of having or not having a penis. At a less met-
aphorical level, even those of us who were initially
hostile to the concept of penis envy have often
been astonished to hear patients unaccustomed
with Freudian theory talk about childhood fan-
tasies that their vagina was a wound or physical
defect. If the reader will forgive an anecdote (we
cannot help it—we are psychoanalytic, and we
break into anecdotes at the slightest provoca-
tion), prior to entering psychology a coworker
of one of us (D. W.) told the author that her 6-
year-old daughter had cried the night before in
the bathtub because her younger brother, with
whom she was bathing, had “one of those
things” and she did not. The author has always
wondered about the impact of the mother’s
tongue-in-cheek reply to her daughter, “Don’t
worry, you’ll get one someday.” The coworker,
incidentally, had never heard of penis envy.

The Structural Model

Whereas Freud’s first model, the topographic
model, categorized mental processes by their
quality vis-à-vis consciousness, his last basic
model, the structural model (see Freud, 1923/
1961, 1933/1964b), categorized mental proc-
cesses by their “functions” or purposes (Jahoda,
1977). With the introduction of this tripartite
model of id, ego, and superego, Freud’s under-
standing of conflict shifted from conflict be-
tween consciousness and the unconscious to
conflict between desires and the dictates of con-
science or reality.

The id is the reservoir of sexual and aggressive
energy and, like the topographic unconscious,
operates on the basis of primary process thought
(i.e., associative, wishful, illogical, nonvoluntary
thought). The superego is the person’s con-
science and is established through identification.
The ego is the structure that must somehow bal-
ance the demands of desire, reality, and morality.
To do this, the ego marshals mechanisms of de-
fense as well as creative compromises among
competing forces. Like the conscious and pre-
conscious of the topographic model, the ego is
characterized by the use of secondary process
thought (controlled, rational, voluntary, planful
thinking). As Bettelheim (1983) observes, in the
original German Freud’s structural model was
phrased in much more colloquial terms—the I,
the it, and the above-me—so that Freud could
actually speak to his patients about feeling that
some moralistic part standing above the self was
judging the self, or that an impulse felt like an
impersonal, uncontrolled force, as in “It just
came over me.”

Developments in Psychoanalysis

Both during and since Freud’s time, psycho-
analysis has changed in significant ways. The
first challenges to psychoanalysis from within
were posed by the early revisionists. Adler and
Jung, and by later neo-Freudians, who ulti-
mately became challengers from without. The
major developments since Freud’s time within
psychoanalysis are ego psychology, object rela-
tions theory and related developments (self psy-
chology and relational theories), and evolving
concepts of conflict and compromise in classical
psychoanalysis. Despite some efforts at integra-
tion across these perspectives (e.g., Kernberg,
1984; Pine, 1990; Westen, 1999b), these ap-
proaches remain in many respects distinct and
sometimes competing propositions about the
mind and personality, which have yet to be thor-
oughly integrated, and contribute to the plural-
ism of contemporary psychoanalytic thinking.

Early Revisionists and Neo-Freudians

Because Adler, Jung, and later neo-Freudians are
not, strictly speaking, psychoanalytic, we touch
upon their work only briefly here. Adler (1929,
1939) and Jung (1971) were among the first
prominent analysts to split with Freud, largely
because they felt, to use Jung’s phrasing, that
Freud viewed the brain “as an appendage to the
genital glands.” Adler, for example, placed a
greater focus on more conscious, everyday mo-
tives and experiences such as needs for achieve-
ment, as well as social motivation and the striv-
ing for superiority.

Since Adler and Jung’s time, the ranks of the
“psychodynamic” have become swollen with
fallen analysts. Psychodynamic theorists such as Hornay (1950), Fromm (1947, 1962), and Sullivan (1953) maintained aspects of the psychoanalytic approach but placed much greater emphasis on the role of social forces in the genesis of personality. These later theorists also rejected Freud’s view of libido as the primary motivational force in human life. For example, Fromm criticized Freud’s theory primarily on four interrelated grounds, all of which have considerable merit. First, he argued, Freud underestimated the extent to which humans are historically and culturally conditioned, so that basic motivations cannot be seen as entirely biologically determined. Second, humans are innately social creatures, and Freud’s psychosexual stages are as much reflections of psychosocial dilemmas (giving or receiving, complying or defying) as they are of an unfolding ontogenetic blueprint (see also Erikson, 1963). Third, Freud treated acts of benevolence, altruism, and pursuit of ideals largely as reaction formations against their opposites, whereas Fromm proposed that humans have innately prosocial tendencies as well. Finally, Freud’s psychology is a psychology of want—that is, of the need to reduce tensions; Fromm proposed that humans have other kinds of motivation as well, such as a need for relatedness to others, a need to be active and creative, and a need for a coherent sense of identity and meaning in life. Fromm, like Erikson, stressed conflicts specific to particular historical time periods and modes of production. He argued, foreshadowing Mahler (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975), that particularly in the present age a central conflict is between autonomy and individuation on the one hand, and the fear of aloneness and loss of connectedness on the other. Today, many theorists within mainstream psychoanalysis would agree with Fromm’s criticisms.

Ego Psychology

Although psychoanalytic theory evolved considerably during Freud’s lifetime, in many ways it remained an “id psychology,” focusing on the vicissitudes of the libidinal drive and the person’s attempts to deal with impulses. A significant shift in psychoanalytic theory began to occur about the time of Freud’s death, with the development of ego psychology, which focuses on the functions and development of the ego (see Blanck & Blanck, 1974, 1979). During the same period in which Anna Freud (1936) was delineating various mechanisms of defense pos-
of identity crisis and formation, and his elucidation of interactions of personality development with historical and cultural forces. Work in ego psychology continues to this day (e.g., Busch, 1995, 1999; Gray 1994).

Object Relations Theory, Self Psychology, and Relational Theories

Undoubtedly the major development in psychoanalysis since Freud has been the emergence of object relations theories and related approaches to personality (see Eagle, 1984; Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Guntrip, 1971; Mitchell, 1988; Scharf & Scharf, 1998). Like most psychoanalytic terms, “object relations” carries many meanings; although, most broadly, the term denotes enduring patterns of interpersonal functioning in intimate relationships and the cognitive and affective processes mediating those patterns.

Object Relations Theories. Although classical psychoanalytic theory focused on the vicissitudes of libido and aggression, from the start clinical practice has been oriented toward the “objects” of drives, and toward the individual’s thoughts and feelings about those objects. Interest in object relations grew as clinicians began confronting patients with personality disorders who were unable to maintain satisfying relationships, and who seemed to be haunted by their fears and fantasies about the dangers of intimate relations with others and by unrealistic, often malevolent representations of significant others (Fairbairn, 1952; Guntrip, 1971; Klein, 1948). In contrast to classical psychoanalytic theory, object relations theory stresses the impact of actual deprivation in infancy and early childhood, the importance of self-representations and representations of others (“object representations”) in mediating interpersonal functioning, and the primary need for human relatedness that begins in infancy.

Psychoanalytic theory has seen a gradual shift from viewing objects as the repositories of drives (Freud, 1905/1953), to objects as fantasy figures (Klein, 1948; Fairbairn, 1952), to objects as psychic representations of real people (Sandler & Rosenblatt, 1962). Alongside this shift has been a continuing debate about whether human social motivation is best conceived of as motivated by the desire for sexual/sensual pleasure or the desire for human contact and relatedness. Fairbairn (1952) and Sullivan (1953) clearly specified interpersonal alternatives to Freud’s theories of motivation and psychic structure, with Fairbairn asserting that libido is object seeking and not pleasure seeking, and Sullivan developing a comprehensive model of the structure and development of personality that emphasized the distortions in personality and self-concept necessitated by the avoidance of interpersonally generated anxiety.

Two major developments in object relations theory in the 1960s were Sandler and Rosenblatt’s (1962) paper on the representational world and Bowlby’s (1969) enunciation of his theory of attachment. Following Jacobson (1954) and others, Sandler and Rosenblatt described the cognitive-affective structure of the “representational world”—that is, of people’s representations of the self and others—in ways that could still profitably be assimilated by researchers studying social cognition. In the 1962 paper, for example, they described the self-concept as a self-schema, and elaborated the importance of distinguishing momentary from prototypic self-representations. Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1982) elaborated on Sandler and Rosenblatt’s concept of “internal working models” of people and relationships but added a powerful reformulation of motivational constructs such as “instinct” by integrating psychoanalytic thinking with control theory and ethology. He argued that attachment is a primary motivational system in humans as in other species, and that its evolutionary significance is the provision of security to immature members of the species. He suggested, further, that the expectations of relationships and the patterns of affective experience and regulation shaped in the first relationships are central determinants of later interpersonal functioning. As will be seen later, his theory has led to an enormous body of empirical research and a confirmation of many of these ideas. Also of considerable importance in the 1960s and 1970s was Mahler’s research (Mahler et al., 1975) based on observation of infants and young children, in which she and her colleagues traced the development of separation—individuation—that is, of the child’s struggle to develop a sense of autonomy and independent selfhood while maintaining an attachment to (or, in Mahler’s theory, libidinal investment in) the primary caretaker.

Although numerous theorists have proposed models of object relations (e.g., Jacobson, 1964; Masterson, 1976), one of the major contemporary theories is Kernberg’s (1975, 1976, 1984)
attempt to wed drive theory, ego psychology, and object relations theory. From the perspective of personality theory, one of Kernberg's central contributions (Kernberg, 1975, 1984) has been his development of the model of levels of personality organization. According to Kernberg, personality organization—that is, the enduring ways people perceive themselves and others, behave interpersonally, pursue their goals, and defend against unpleasant feelings—can be understood on a continuum of pathology. Individuals whose personality is organized at a psychotic level have difficulty knowing what is inside or outside their heads and tend to be tremendously interpersonally alienated. Individuals with a borderline level of personality organization can clearly distinguish inner and outer (that is, they do not hallucinate), but they have difficulty maintaining consistent views of themselves and others over time, and they are prone to severe distortions in the way they perceive reality—particularly interpersonal reality—when the going gets tough. People at a neurotic to normal level of personality organization may have all kinds of conflicts, concerns, and problems (such as low self-esteem, anxiety, and so forth), but they are generally able to love and to work effectively.

Kernberg proposes a model of normal and pathological development that attempts to account for these different levels of personality organization. The basic logic of Kernberg's developmental model is that development proceeds from a lack of awareness in infancy of the distinction between self and other, to a differentiation of representations based on affective valence (i.e., "good" vs. "bad" people and experiences) in the toddler years, to an eventual construction of mature representations that integrate ambivalent feelings by age 5 or 6. Kernberg formulated his theory to account for phenomena observed in the treatment of severe personality disorders, notably the tendency of these patients toward "splitting" (the separation of good and bad representations, so that the person cannot see the self or others at a particular time with any richness or complexity). The preschooler scolded by his or her mother who yells, "Mommy, I hate you! You don't love me!" is evidencing this normal developmental incapacity to retrieve memories of interactions with the mother associated with a different affective tone; later, according to Kernberg, splitting can be used defensively to maintain idealizations of the self or significant others, or to protect the other from the individual's own aggressive impulses.

**Self Psychology.** Whereas Kernberg retains many elements of the classical theory of drive, conflict, and defense, self psychology, developed by Heinz Kohut (1966, 1971, 1977, 1984), represents a much more radical departure. Kohut originally developed his theory as an attempt to explain the phenomenology and symptomatology of patients with narcissistic personality disorders (Kohut, 1966). Whereas in his early work Kohut defined the "self" as other analysts had since Hartmann (1950)—as a collection of self representations (and hence an ego function, as cognition is an ego function)—later Kohut (1971, 1977) came to view a psychology of the self as complementary to the classical theory of drive and defense. By the end of his life, Kohut (1984; Kohut & Wolf, 1978) argued that defects in the self, not conflicts, are critical in psychopathology, and that classical psychoanalysis has been superseded by self psychology. "Self" in this later work refers to a psychic structure on a par with, or superordinate to, id, ego, and superego. Kohut describes this structure as bipolar, with ambitions on one side, ideals on the other, and talents and skills driven by these two poles "arched" between them.

Although Kohut's terminology can be confusing, the thrust of his argument is that having a core of ambitions and ideals, talents and skills with which to try to actualize them, and a cohesive and positive sense of self is what mental health is all about. The extent to which children develop these is determined, according to Kohut, by the extent to which their caretakers in the first years of life themselves are healthy along these dimensions, and can thus respond empathically when their children need them and can impart their own sense of security and self-esteem to their children. For Kohut, ambitions, ideals, and the need for self-esteem are three primary motivational systems in humans.

Kohut's developmental theory, like that of most psychoanalytic theorists, proposes that the infant begins in a state of relatively poor differentiation of self and other, characterized by fragmented, unintegrated representations; he calls this the stage of the fragmented self. At some time in the second year a "nuclear self," or core sense of self, emerges, with the bipolar structure described above. What he means by this is that,
on the one hand, the child is driven by a fantasied sense of the self as omnipotent and omniscient, which Kohut calls the grandiose self. On the other hand, the child endows her parents with a similar greatness, creating what Kohut calls the idealized parent imago. If the child’s primary caretakers are unempathic, chronically responding to their own needs instead of those of the infant, the child will develop defects in one or both poles of the self. This may lead to symptoms such as grandiosity, poor self-esteem, a desperate need to be attended to and admired, and severe problems in establishing a cohesive sense of identity.

Relational Theories. Perhaps the most important recent development in psychoanalysis is the emergence of relational theories (Aron, 1996; Mitchell, 1988, 1993, 1997), which in many respects is an outgrowth of both object relations theories within psychoanalysis and the interpersonal theory of Harry Stack Sullivan (1953). Like both of these theoretical viewpoints, relational theories stress the importance of motives for relatedness and discount the importance of sexual and aggressive drives or wishes. They also emphasize the importance of internalization of interpersonal interactions in the development of personality, arguing that the child’s fundamental adaptations are to the interpersonal world, and that the building blocks of personality are the ideas and images the child forms of the self and significant others. We will discuss these theories in slightly greater detail below.

Developments in Classical Psychoanalysis

Alongside these various developments have come changes in the classical model since Freud’s time. Although these have been many, some of the major changes have come about through the systematizing and revisionist efforts of Charles Brenner (1982). Freud developed many models of the mind and never made a concerted attempt to reconcile them, with the result that some psychoanalysts continued to speak in the language of the topographic model, whereas others spoke more in the language of Freud’s later structural model. Arlow and Brenner (1964) made an important contribution by translating accounts of phenomena explained by the topographic model, such as dreams, into structural terms, and by demonstrating the superiority and comprehensiveness of the structural model. Since that time, Brenner in particular has been reformulating many basic Freudian constructs while attempting to preserve what is most important in the classical theory. Brenner’s attempts at reformulation are set forth most succinctly in The Mind in Conflict (1982), which expresses the classical theory, as revised by decades of psychoanalytic practice, probably as clearly and persuasively as it could be expressed. (For a review of the development of Brenner’s work, see also Richards, 1986.)

Brenner’s major contribution has been his elaboration of the concept of compromise formation. Freud proposed that neurotic symptoms represent compromises among competing forces in the mind, particularly impulses, superego prohibitions, and the constraints of reality. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900/1953a), Freud proposed that compromise is crucial in dream formation as well. Brenner’s extension of Freud’s theory was to suggest that all psychological events are compromise formations that include various elements of wishes, anxiety, depressive affect, defense, and superego prohibitions. For example, the academic who derives pleasure from his or her work may simultaneously be gratifying wishes to be superior to competitors, shaped in the oedipal years, which are satisfied by feelings of intellectual superiority; gratifying wishes to be admired, which are achieved by being surrounded by a cadre of graduate students (probably an illusionary gratification); allaying anxiety by mastering intellectual domains of uncertainty and solving small problems in the discipline; warding off depressive affect by bolstering self-esteem through publishing papers, making presentations, and winning the esteem of colleagues; and satisfying superego mandates by being disciplined in scientific method and seeking truth.

From the perspective of personality theory, Brenner’s list of ingredients involved in compromise formations probably requires some tinkering (Westen, 1985, 1998a). Notably absent are the need to see things as they really are, as well as cognitive processes leading to relatively veridical perception and cognition, which surely get expressed in beliefs along with more dynamic processes. Nevertheless, the basic point is that people are always synthesizing momentary compromises among multiple and competing mental processes. Some of these compromises
are relatively stable and enduring, whereas others exist only briefly, because the “balance of forces” within the person is constantly changing in response to thoughts, feelings, fantasies, and environmental events.

CURRENT CONTROVERSIES IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

Currently psychoanalysis is in a state of flux, with no single theory in the ascendant. Indeed, in some ways, the 1990s have seen a flight from theory, as analysts have increasingly recognized the limitations of Freud’s models of the mind but have begun to despair of the possibility of any comprehensive alternative. The loss of consensus and faith in Freud’s models of the mind within psychoanalysis began to take shape in the 1970s with a growing disenchantment with drive theory, energy concepts, aspects of the structural model, the distance of concepts such as “libidinal cathexis” and “drive fusion” from observable psychological events, and the persistent tendency in psychoanalytic literature for Freud’s structures to be retified (as if “the ego” feels or chooses something). An influential group of psychoanalytic theorists began to suggest abandonment of much of Freud’s theoretical superstructure, denoted his “metapsychology,” in favor of the more experience-near concepts (e.g., repression, defense, conflict) that constitute what has been called the “clinical theory” of psychoanalysis (Klein, 1976; Schafer, 1976).

The positive side of this “cultural revolution” within psychoanalysis is that it ultimately changed the nature of psychoanalytic discourse, which once required rigid adherence to particular dogmas and led maverick theorists to hide their innovations in classical garb. The negative side of this quiet revolution is that psychoanalytic practice is now guided less by an explicit set of theoretical propositions about personality and psychopathology than by an implicit one. Indeed, psychoanalytic theory today is less about personality and more about clinical technique and the nature of subjectivity. Nevertheless, a number of interrelated issues are at the forefront of thinking in contemporary psychoanalysis and have substantial relevance to personality psychology. Here we address two of these issues: The nature of motivation, and what it means to know a person.

The Nature of Motivation

Freud’s theory of motivation has always been both the heart and the Achilles’ heel of psychoanalytic theory. Psychoanalysis is, above all else, a theory of the complexities of human motivation and the ways in which motives interact, conflict, and attain surreptitious expression. Despite multiple changes in his motivational theories throughout his career, Freud was unflagging in his view of sexuality as the primary instinct in humans that draws them to each other and motivates much of their behavior, and in his corresponding implication of sexuality in the etiology of neurosis. As an inveterate biologist who never entirely relinquished his wish to ground his theory in physiology (Sulloway, 1979), Freud maintained a theory of psychic energy in his latest models of the mind that was a clear descendent of a purely physiological theory he developed in 1895 but abandoned and chose never to publish (Freud, 1950/1966; see Pribram & Gill, 1976).

The Demise of the Classical Freudian Theory of Motivation

The libido theory was, as noted earlier, the point of contention that drove many of Freud’s adherents from the fold in the early part of the 20th century. By the 1980s, fealty to Freud’s theory of motivation was becoming “optional” for maintaining good standing in analytic circles, and by the 1990s, most psychoanalysts and psychoanalytic psychologists had abandoned much of Freud’s theory of motivation, including his dual-instinct theory, his model of a displacable psychic energy, his drive-discharge model of motivation, and the notion of a primary aggressive drive (see Gill, 1976; Holt, 1976; Rubenstein, 1976; Shevrin, 1984). The reasons are complex and many, but perhaps the most important were the recognition that not all motives can be reduced to sex and aggression; that motives for intimacy are not uniformly reducible to sexual desire; that not all motives (particularly aggressive motives) build up and require discharge; and that Freud’s energy concepts (the notion of a displacable psychic energy), though powerful metaphors, were too unwieldy and scientific.

Although most psychoanalytic theorists today recognize that the time has come to replace Freud’s theory of motivation, no coherent theory has yet emerged to replace it. Even before Freud’s death, Melanie Klein (1948) argued for
the importance of motives such as envy. Fairbairn (1952) and other object relations theorists argued for the importance of relatedness to others, which Bowlby (1969) developed into a more systematic theory of attachment-related motivation years later, and which relational theorists (Mitchell, 1988) tend to view as the primary motive in humans. Robert White (1959) emphasized the need to be effective or to attain mastery, and he reinterpreted Freud's psychosexual stages along these lines. Kohut (1971) emphasized the needs for self-esteem and for a sense of cohesion, and described what could go wrong in development to lead some people to have difficulty regulating their self-esteem or to be vulnerable to feelings of fragmentation. Whereas many theorists have attempted to replace Freud's relatively simple two-motive theory with equally reductionist theories, others have offered more complex formulations. For example, Lichtenberg (1989) has proposed that human motivation involves five motivational systems: physiological regulation, attachment, exploration/assertion, withdrawal or antagonism in response to aversive events, and sensual/sexual pleasure.

Most contemporary psychoanalytic approaches to motivation, particularly in clinical practice, continue to retain some key features of Freud's theory, at least implicitly, such as the recognition of the importance of unconscious motives. Nevertheless, the psychoanalytic theory of motivation would profit from greater acquaintance with both evolutionary theory and relevant psychological research (Westen, 1997). For example, rather than speculating about how many motives human have, psychoanalytically oriented researchers might instead try to develop a relatively comprehensive list of motives as expressed in clinical sessions, everyday interactions, and ethnographies, and use statistical aggregation procedures such as factor analysis to see which ones, empirically, cluster together. Knowing something about the neural pathways that mediate different psychological motive systems, and considering their possible evolutionary functions, might also be useful in deciding to what extent various motives should be considered part of the same system or relatively independent of each other. The notion that the desires for sex and for relatedness to others are transformations of the same underlying drive makes little sense in light of what we now know about the distinct functions of different hypothalamic regions and neural circuits linking cortical and subcortical brain structures.

Affect and Motivation
If any consensus is beginning to emerge in the psychoanalytic literature, it is probably a deceptively simple one that has always implicitly guided clinical practice, and was anticipated in the psychological literature by Tomkins (1962) and others: that affect is a primary motivational mechanism in humans (Pervin, 1982; Sandler, 1987; Speziano, 1993; Westen, 1985, 1997). In other words, people are drawn to actions, objects, and representations associated with positive feelings or the anticipation of positive feelings, and are repulsed by those associated with negative feelings or the likely activation of negative feelings.

This simple formula has a number of complications and ramifications that are—or, we believe, will soon be—the focus of increased attention. Four are of particular significance. First, these affect-driven motivational pulls need not be conscious. As we will see, experimental research supports the proposition that people often respond simultaneously to multiple such pulls in various directions. Second, precisely how to integrate an affect theory of motivation with phenomena such as eating and sex, which have traditionally been understood in both psychology and psychoanalysis in terms of drives, is not yet entirely clear. One possibility, for example, is that drive states may take on motivational significance only to the extent that they lead to feeling states such as sexual arousal or hunger, or to the extent that they become associatively linked with experiences of pleasure.

Third, a shift to thinking of motives in terms of affects and efforts at affect regulation—that is, the selection of behaviors and mental processes based on their emotional consequences—allows one to avoid choosing among overly reductionistic single-motive or dual-motive systems that are unlikely to do justice to the complexity of human motivation. Fairbairn (1952), for example, brought something very important into psychoanalysis by challenging the view that the desire for relationships is really just a derivative of the sexual drive. He argued, instead, that things are the other way around: libido (desire) is object seeking (desirous of relationships) not pleasure seeking (desirous of sex).
Yet the antinomy between pleasure seeking and object seeking is only an antinomy in the context of Freud's specific meaning of libido, which confounds pleasure seeking with sexual pleasure seeking. People have a number of desires for connectedness with others, from wishes for physical proximity and security to desires for affiliation, intimacy, and a sense of belongingness. These are clearly mediated by affective systems—that is, characterized by pleasure seeking (and pain avoidance)—just as surely as are sexual desires. As Bowlby elucidated (1969, 1973), the child's attachment behavior is mediated by feelings such as separation distress, pleasure at being held in the mother's arms, or relief at reunion. There is no prior reason a person cannot be simultaneously motivated by several motive systems, each mediated by pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings, including both attachment and sensual/sexual gratification (Westen, 1985, 1997).

A fourth ramification is that a shift to an affect theory of motivation has the salutary effect of permitting much more coherent thinking about interactions of affect and cognition in psychoanalysis than has previously been the case, and is likely to allow much more (and more useful) contact with research on affect and cognition in empirical psychology (see Westen, in press-a). One example is the growing recognition that motives involve representations of desired, feared, or valued outcomes associatively linked with various feeling states. A prime example is the concept of wish, which has begun to replace the concept of drive in even classical analytic circles (Brenner, 1982; Dahl, 1983; Holt, 1976; Sandler & Sandler, 1978; Westen, 1985, 1997). "Wish" is an experience-near construct that does not rely on 19th-century energy concepts and is intuitively much more compelling.

Wishes may arise through interaction of biological and environmental events, as affects become associated in preprogrammed and learned ways with various cognitive representations and structures. For example, in the second half of the first year, separation from a primary attachment figure (we will use the example of the mother) may trigger a distress response that is genetically programmed (given, of course, the proper environmental input, referred to in the psychoanalytic literature as an "average expectable environment"). When the return of the mother repeatedly quells this distress, the association of her representation with regulation of an aversive affective state creates an affect-laden representation of a desired state that is activated when the mother has been out of sight for a period of time and sets in motion a wish for proximity.

Implications for Personality Theory

Although the links may not be readily apparent, these trends in psychoanalysis are of considerable relevance to personality psychology more broadly. The debate about drive theory and its potential successors is a debate about the nature of human motivation, which branches into questions about the role of affect and cognition in motivation, the extent to which motives endure over time, the circumstances under which motives and affects are chronically elicited in ways that bear the signature of an individual's personality, and the interaction of nature and nurture in generating the motives that underlie human behavior. Trait approaches to personality tend to remain silent on motivational issues. Social learning and social-cognitive approaches tend to emphasize conscious, cognitive, rational, and environmentally induced motivations, and to study them without reference to their developmental vicissitudes. Each of these approaches could profitably wrestle with some of these issues facing psychoanalysis.

From a psychoanalytic standpoint, what is crucial is any reconceptualization of the concept of motivation are several elements of classical Freudian theory that remain central, if implicitly, in psychoanalytically oriented clinical thinking about motives and are too easily forgotten: Motives can (1) be active consciously or unconsciously; (2) combine and interact in complex ways; (3) conflict with equally compelling wishes, fears, or internal standards in which a person has invested emotionally; (4) be rooted in the biology of the organism and hence not readily "shut off"; and (5) feel "it-like" (Freud's clinical concept of the "id," or "it"), or like nonself, precisely because they are peremptory and cannot be readily eliminated. As we will see, many of these features of psychoanalytic approaches to motivation, particularly the focus on unconscious motivational processes and on conflict and compromise, have considerable empirical support.

On the other hand, one of the major dangers inherent in a theory that begins with the assumption that everything is motivated is its potential to overestimate the role of motivation and underestimate the importance of expectations derived in part from social learning. The
pervasive expectations of malevolence in borderline patients, which have been documented in several studies (e.g., Lerner & St. Peter, 1984; Westen, Lohr, Silk, Gold, & Kerben, 1990; Nigg, Lohr, Westen, Gold, & Silk, 1992), were for years interpreted from within the classical framework as projections of aggression. Although this is clearly part of the picture, research over the last decade has documented extremely high frequencies of childhood abuse, particularly sexual abuse, in the histories of patients with borderline personality disorder (Herman et al., 1989; Zanarini, 1997). The malevolent object world of the patient with borderline personality disorder is thus likely to reflect in part real experiences of abuse. Where dynamic explanations are essential, however, is in recognizing the extent to which such expectations can be perpetuated by ways the person subsequently behaves, which themselves may reflect motives, affect regulation strategies, and interpersonal patterns shaped in the context of abusive or neglectful child-rearing experiences. These patterns (such as readily switching to a malevolent view of someone who is being momentarily frustrating, and hence behaving impulsively or responding angrily) can in turn elicit precisely what the person fears, leading to further and confirmatory experiences of rejection or abuse (see Wachtel, 1997, on “cyclical psychodynamics”). Perhaps the take-home message is that a theory of personality must take seriously both cognition and conation. Any effort to reduce one consistently to the other is likely to be an oversimplification.

What Does It Mean to Know a Person?

Alongside these theoretical issues, a growing controversy has emerged over the epistemological status of psychoanalytic data and theory—that is, the kind of knowledge (if any) that psychoanalysis as a theory and a method affords. What does it mean to know, and know about, a person? To what extent are the narratives the patient constructs in psychotherapy or psychoanalysis (1) a record of the historical past; (2) an index of the patient’s current ways of experiencing the self, others, and the past; or (3) an index of the efforts of two people to come to terms with the person’s past and present in the context of a particular relationship?

As we will see, these issues, too, are of import for the study of personality, given the tendency of many researchers to take patients’ self-reports of their personality as an index of who they are, rather than as compromise formations that reflect an amalgam of their efforts to perceive themselves accurately, to regulate their self-esteem, to avoid warded-off representations of self that remind them of significant others from the past (McWilliams, 1994, 1998), to approach idealized representations of significant others, to manage guilt or shame, and so forth.

Psychoanalytic Constructions: Narrative or Historical Truth?

Questions such as these first came to the fore as theorists began to wrestle with the extent to which real events influence psychic events, and the correlative question of the extent to which actual historical events in the life of a patient are psychoanalytically knowable or useful. Freud initially believed hysteria to result from sexual abuse, but the extremely high prevalence of reports of childhood seductions by his patients eventually led him to believe that many of these reports must represent childhood fantasies. It is now clear that Freud, in so shifting directions, vastly underestimated the prevalence of actual abuse; however, this shift was important theoretically, because it inaugurated Freud’s focus on “psychic reality” as opposed to “actual reality.” This focus has been a cornerstone of psychoanalytic thinking, most systematically adhered to in more classical circles (Arlow, 1985). The point is that the way a person reacts to an event is determined by the way he or she experiences it, which in turn is crucially influenced by motives, fantasies, and affect-laden ideas. In many ways, the shift in Freud’s thinking parallels the similar shift in cognitive-behavioral thinking that occurred in the 1960s, as researchers shifted from viewing stimuli as causes to focusing on the influence on behavior of the way environmental events are construed and expected by the organism.

The concept of psychic reality raises some challenging questions about the extent to which what matters psychologically is what actually happens or how the person construes what happens. Complicating things considerably is that it is often exceedingly difficult to know where to place a patient’s accounts of present and past relationships on the continuum from relatively accurate to relatively inaccurate or distorted—or, for that matter, where to place the patient’s accounts of his or her past psychic reality (e.g., “I used to think I was . . .”).

Spence (1982) opened a Pandora’s box by advancing an elegant argument that what happens
in psychoanalytic treatment is not an act of archaeology, or recovering the past, but an act of mutual storytelling, in which patient and analyst construct a compelling narrative that provides the patient with an integrated view of his or her history and helps explain seemingly inexplicable aspects of the patient's life. Juxtaposed with historical truth is what Spence called narrative truth, which "depends on continuity and closure and the extent to which the fit of the pieces takes on an aesthetic finality. Narrative truth is what we have in mind when we say that such and such is a good story" (p. 31).

Spence made an important distinction between therapeutic gains that may accrue from coming to understand oneself better, and gains that may accrue from coming to believe that one has done so. He also gave voice to an emerging trend in the practice of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychotherapy away from an archaological search for hidden memories—or for psychic boils in need of lancing—and toward a more interactive therapeutic stance focused on the here-and-now, including the here-and-now of the interaction between patient and therapist. On the other hand, Spence introduced a relativistic position into psychoanalysis that is philosophically problematic and has grown more so in the intervening decades since publication of his book. In arguing that reconstructions of the past are constructions and that such include elements of fiction, he seemed to conclude that they are therefore nothing but fiction. The intermingling of reality with the observer's own cognitive structure is, however, true of all science and all cognition. As Morris Eagle (personal communication) has observed, the problem may not be so much Spence's argument but his affording the status of "truth" to narrative truth. One could surely concoct an aesthetically pleasing story in which the Holocaust never happened, but most of us are outraged by neo-Nazi revisionists who claim truth status for this narrative. Coherence of structure and veridicality are two essential elements of a good theory, not criteria for competing brands of truth.

Science or Hermeneutics?
The question of the nature of truth in psychoanalysis—vertical reconstruction versus narrative coherence—dovetails with a question about precisely what kind of discipline psychoanalysis is or should be. Freud was quite clear—at least most of the time—in his view that psychoanaly-
chological or psychological makes no difference to an account of causality: To be causal, an event X must simply make a difference to the occurrence of another event Y, and intentions can do this as well as material causes can (see also Edelson, 1984, 1985; Holt, 1981).

In some respects, we suspect the controversy over whether psychoanalysis should be a scientific or interpretative/hermeneutic enterprise reflects to some extent a failure to consider the circumstances under which scientific and interpretive thinking are useful. There can be little doubt that one of the most important legacies of psychoanalysis for psychology is the recognition that meaning often does not lie on the surface of people’s actions or communications and hence requires interpretation. To put it another way, more congenial to contemporary thinking in cognitive neuroscience, the crux of psychoanalysis as an interpretive approach is in the exploration and mapping of a patient’s associational networks, which are, by virtue of both mental architecture and efforts at affect regulation, not available to introspection (Westen, 1998, in press-a,c,d). What skilled clinicians do, and what skilled clinical supervisors teach, is a way of listening to the manifest content of a patient’s communications and recognizing patterns of thought, feeling, motivation, and behavior that seem to co-occur and become activated under particular circumstances. This is one of the major reasons we believe psychoanalysis has a great deal to offer personality psychology in terms of methods of inquiry, which aim less at asking people to describe themselves than to express themselves, and in so doing to reveal themselves.

On the other hand, the implicit principles that underlie psychoanalytic interpretative efforts are in fact empirical propositions, such as the view that people often reveal their characteristic ways of experiencing themselves and others in the therapeutic relationship, that their conscious beliefs can reflect transformations of unconscious beliefs distorted by their wishes, that their behaviors and beliefs can reflect compromises among multiple competing motives, and so forth. As we will see, many of these broad assumptions have received considerable empirical support, but this does not absolve clinicians or theorists from the need to test the more specific theoretical assumptions that underlie their interpretations with their patients. These interpretations are frequently guided by theories of motivation, emotion, or development that lead particular clinicians to offer interpretations from a Freudian, Kleinian, object-relational, interpersonal, self-psychological, relational, or other point of view. Given the multitude of ways a clinician can interpret a particular piece of clinical data, it is surely not a matter of indifference whether some or all of the theoretical propositions underlying his preferred theoretical orientation are empirically inaccurate.

Postmodern Views

By the late 1980s and early 1990s, these questions about the scientific status of psychoanalysis converged with “postmodern” approaches in the humanities that radically challenge the nature of knowledge and the scientific pursuit of it. According to these thinkers, Freud and the classical psychoanalysis that he developed are exemplars of modernity, that is, a positivist search for an objective truth. In the case of psychoanalysis, this search manifests itself in a quest for objective truth about a patient observed dispassionately by the analyst. A variety of contemporary schools of thought have challenged this traditional view of the psychoanalytic enterprise, some of them under the banner of postmodernism and some of them simply reflecting greater humility than psychoanalysis of old. These postmodern approaches go under a number of names, including mutuality, intersubjectivity, social constructivism, relativism, and perspectivism, all of which regard absolute objectivity as a myth (Aron, 1996; Gill, 1994; Greenberg, 1991; Hoffman, 1991, 1998; Levine, 1994; Mitchell, 1993, 1997; Natterson, 1991; Ogden, 1994; Renik, 1993, 1998; Slosrow, Brandschaft, & Arwood, 1987).

A common theme in this literature is that the perceptions of the patient are inevitably colored by the subjectivity of the analytic interpreter. Inherent in postmodernism is a skepticism about any fundamental truths. In this regard the concept of essentialism—the idea that people (or things) have objective “essences” — is often a foil for the postmodernists. Reality itself is viewed as growing out of social and linguistic constructions. Postmodernists doubt that any theories or ideas are an accurate reflection of an objective reality “out there” (Aron, 1996; Holland, 1993; Leary, 1994).

These postmodern perspectives are often referred to collectively as two-person theories or two-person psychologies. They are distinguished from the one-person psychology inherent in older views of psychoanalytic technique and ob-
servation that viewed the patient (the one person) as an object to be known, rather than as a person whose personality is expressed, interpreted, and shaped in interaction with significant others, notably the analyst or therapist. Although radically postmodern ideas certainly have their advocates, most psychoanalytic theorists and clinicians do not approach the extreme form of postmodernism known as relativism, in which the possibility of truth is denied entirely. Rather, they approach the analytic situation with a combination of realism and perspectivism that acknowledges the presence of an external reality but emphasizes that each participant in the analytic dyad brings his or her own perspective to bear on that reality (Gabbard, 1997a).

Among the most influential of these two-person theories is Stephen Mitchell's (1993, 1997) relational-conflict model. Unlike Freud's model of intrapsychic conflict between structural agencies, such as the ego, superego, and id, Mitchell views conflicts as relational configurations. Conflict is inherent in relationships, and these conflicted relationships are internalized from early in life and re-experienced in adulthood, as people seek interactions with others that actualize often competing and sometimes destructive prototypes from earlier in life. Mitchell acknowledges his debt to theorists from the British School of object relations, such as Fairbairn and Winnicott. He was also influenced by American interpersonalists such as Sullivan, who emphasized the role of actual relationships in shaping and maintaining personality processes. Like object relations approaches, Mitchell's approach, and that of all postmodern theorists, share the view that object seeking (seeking relationships) is more fundamental in the realm of human motivation than the pursuit of instinctual (sexual and aggressive) pleasure.

Ogden (1994) emphasizes an "analytic third" that is intersubjectively created by analyst and analysand. In this variant of intersubjectivity, a third subjectivity is created in the "potential space" between the two subjectivities of analyst and patient. Benjamin (1990), on the other hand, regards intersubjectivity as a developmental achievement involving the full recognition of separateness and autonomy in the other party. In other words, a genuine relationship is one in which both parties recognize both their separateness and their interdependence. A goal of some psychoanalytic treatments is thus for the person to learn to treat others, including the analyst, as separate subjects rather than as objects to be used by the patient for the gratification of the patient's needs. Benjamin states it succinctly: "Where objects were, subjects must be" (1990, p.34). Other theorists, such as Stolorow and Atwood (1992), emphasize less the recognition of autonomy than the inevitable intersubjectivity that arises when two people come together for an emotionally significant purpose, a prime example of which is the therapeutic situation. Similarly, Hoffman's (1983, 1991, 1998) social constructivist, or dialectical-constructivist, approach focuses on the replacement of a positivist orientation with a constructivist view in which the analyst's personal involvement is seen as having a continuous effect on what the analyst understands about the patient and the interaction—as well as on the way the patient experiences the analyst and the analytic situation.

Postmodern and relational theorists, like some psychologists and feminist scholars, have also questioned the objectivity of time-honored categories such as self and gender. Some have offered notions of "multiple selves," emphasizing the fluidity and contextual construction of self-representations. Schafer (1989), for example, describes the experiential self as "the set of varying narratives that seem to be told by a cast of varied selves to and about a cast of varied selves" (p. 157). Mitchell (1993) and Aron (1995) have also argued for a set of multiple self-representations that may be discontinuous with one another and are highly influenced by the relational context. Similarly, many theorists have come to regard a major feature of personality, gender, as a more fluid construct than once supposed (Aron, 1995; Benjamin, 1995; Gabbard & Wilkinson, 1996; Harris, 1991). Whereas classical psychoanalytic theory tended to emphasize same-gender identifications (or warded off cross-gender identifications), theorists emphasize the multiplicity of identifications with male and female figures that occur over the course of development.

Some analysts have argued that sounding the death knell for objectivity in psychoanalysis is premature. Cavell (1998) and Gabbard (1997a) both argue that there is room for both objectivity and subjectivity within psychoanalytic theory. Cavell (1998) avers that whereas meaning may be constructed, truth is not. Our perception of truth may change, but not the truths themselves. Gabbard (1997a) stresses the derivation of the term "objectivity" from the word "object," referring to something external to the thinking mind of the subject. He points out that
through the influence of the patient's behavior, the analyst begins to experience what other people experience in relationship to the patient. Hence the analyst's position as a person external to the patient provides the analyst the opportunity to present a different view of the patient's experience.

Indeed, there is something naive about many of the critiques of "modernism" in psychoanalysis, in two senses. First, they fail to recognize the extent to which "postmodern" concerns have been influential in the social sciences at least since the "premodern" writing of Karl Marx, who similarly viewed modernist "objectivity" as a myth, and a motivated one at that. There is something deeply ironic about postmodernism attacking the work of Sigmund Freud, an heir to Marx and the German philosophical tradition that emphasized the distinction between the manifest and the latent, and a thinker who emphasized, perhaps above all, the ubiquity of self-deception in people's conscious beliefs and ideologies. Second, many contemporary postmodern approaches are, like much of postmodern writing, vulnerable to many of the problems that rendered "premodern" relativism (e.g., of early 20th-century anthropology) untenable. For example, if nothing is objectively true, then the statement that "nothing is true" is just one more assertion among competing assertions, all of which should ultimately be discarded because none is true. Further, no analyst actually believes, or could believe, such a radically relativistic point of view and survive in the world (or make an honest living). If no knowledge is privileged, or at least probabilistically more likely than other points of view, then analysts should be just as happy to become behaviorists and tell a different set of stories to their patients. Or better yet, they should become barbers, because there is nothing about their training or knowledge that renders their potential co-constructions any more useful than those of the patient's barber as barber and patient chat away, co-construing an intersubjective field.

There is probably a reason that postmodernism has taken hold in the humanities, anthropology, and psychoanalysis (but not in mainstream psychology), because each of these disciplines shares a methodological feature: the lack of any solid rules for choosing among competing hypotheses. Researchers can interpret empirical findings with quantifiable effect sizes and significance levels in different ways, but quantitative data place constraints on the cognitive concoctions of curious minds. No serious reader of the literature on the behavioral genetics of schizophrenia, for example, could come away with the conclusion that genetics play little role in the etiology of the disorder. There is in fact a reality expressed by heritability coefficients, open as it may be to multiple interpretations, but the interpretations made by a person with expertise and a sound mind are constrained by the data, just as are interpretations in clinical practice.

Implications for Personality Theory

The points of controversy currently enlivening the psychoanalytic scene are not, strictly speaking, only psychoanalytic concerns; many of them point to fundamental issues for personality theory more generally. From the perspective of personality psychology, one way to describe the changing psychoanalytic landscape is to suggest that psychoanalytic theory is increasingly catching up with psychoanalytic practice in recognizing the extent to which personality lies in person-by-situation interactions. Personality is not something people carry with them and express everywhere; rather, personality processes are essentially if . . . then . . . contingencies (Mischel & Shoda, 1995), in which particular circumstances—including external situations as well as conscious and unconscious configurations of meaning—elicit particular ways of thinking, feeling, or behaving.

From a methodological standpoint, this means that we cannot assume that what we see in any research situation—whether a more traditional laboratory experiment or the "laboratory" of the clinical consulting room—is a "pure specimen" of behavior independent of its context. The increasing focus in psychoanalytic writing on countertransference and the role of the analyst's own history, feelings, beliefs, and subjectivity on the way he or she interprets data (e.g., Tansey & Burke, 1989; Renik, 1993, 1998) suggests a more self-critical attitude that might be useful in personality psychology as well. Researchers' choice of theories, hypotheses, and methods are not independent of their own affective, motivational, and cognitive biases, which should routinely be a part of their own empirical inquiries. In a recent study, Morrison and Westen (1999) found that psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioral clinicians perceived their patients very similarly in terms of clinically significant personality problems, except two: Cog-
ative-behavioral clinicians saw fewer problems with emotional constriction and rigidity. Whether this reflects underdiagnosis on their part or overdiagnosis by analytic clinicians (or simply different postmodern readings of the same "texts"), it does not seem unlikely that researchers gravitate toward theories and methods that suit their own emotional styles, not to mention express their loyalty to authority figures, such as dissertation advisers, from their own past. Some of the most virulent attacks on Freud would be difficult to understand—most dead people do not draw such passion—without considering such affective biases and loyalties. Similarly, the personal demands of handing research participants questionnaires versus engaging them in in-depth interviews about poignant personal experiences are very different, and it would be surprising if a preference for one or another were completely orthogonal to interpersonal needs, attachment styles, and so forth.

The infusion of postmodernism into psychoanalysis also has implications for personality psychology. Just as analysts can no longer assume the objectivity of their interpretive frames and must pay more attention to the interpretive frames of their actively constructing subjects, so, too, personality psychologists need to think more carefully about the circumstances under which asking participants to describe themselves using statements constructed by the observer—that is, questionnaires—does justice to the subjectivity, and hence the personality, of the observed.

Another implication of the "two-person" point of view in psychoanalysis is that a central aspect of personality is a set of characteristic internal object relations—ways of representing and feeling about the self, others, and relationships—that evoke specific responses in others (Gabbard, in press; Gabbard, 1997c; Sandler, 1976). A central aspect of personality, then, may be the attempt to actualize certain patterns of relatedness that reflect unconscious wishes and action patterns forged in childhood and shaped through subsequent interactions.

ENDURING CONTRIBUTIONS AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

Psychoanalysis has made a number of enduring contributions to psychology, and particularly to personality theory. Some of these take the form of testable propositions that have stood the test of time; others are better conceived as guiding assumptions that are theoretically or methodologically useful. With respect to testable propositions, when one considers not only research generated by psychoanalytic researchers but also experimental findings in other research traditions that corroborate, dovetail with, or refine basic psychoanalytic hypotheses, one finds that the empirical basis of psychoanalytic concepts is far better documented, and that psychoanalytic thinking is far more widely applicable, than is typically assumed. Westen (1998a, in press-b) has reviewed the empirical data on five basic postulates of contemporary psychodynamic thinking that have stood the test of time:

1. Much of mental life is unconscious, including thoughts, feelings, and motives.
2. Mental processes, including affective and motivational processes, operate in parallel, so that individuals can have conflicting feelings toward the same person or situation that motivate them in opposing ways and often lead to compromise solutions.
3. Stable personality patterns begin to form in childhood, and childhood experiences play an important role in personality development, particularly in shaping the ways people form later social relationships.
4. Mental representations of the self, others, and relationships guide people's interactions with others and influence the ways they become psychologically symptomatic.
5. Personality development involves not only learning to regulate sexual and aggressive feelings but also moving from an immature, socially dependent state to a mature interdependent one.

We will not repeat that review here, but will instead briefly describe what we believe are a set of fundamental insights, concepts, and ways of orienting to the data of personality that psychoanalytic approaches continue to offer.

Unconscious Processes

The most fundamental assumption of psychoanalytic theory, which once provided the major distinction between it and every other approach to personality, is that much of mental life, including thought, feeling, and motivation, is unconscious. Freud was not, of course, the first to recognize unconscious processes; he was in many respects the end of the line of a long tradition of
German philosophy that focused on "the unconscious" (Ellenberger, 1970; Weinberger, in press). Yet he was the first and only theorist to base an entire approach to personality on the notion that much of what people consciously think and feel and most of their conscious choices are determined outside of awareness. He was also the first to try to describe the nature of unconscious processes systematically.

During the 1940s and 1950s, and into the 1960s, researchers associated with the "New Look" in perception (see Bruner, 1973; Erdelyi, 1974, 1985) studied the influence of motives, expectations, and defenses on perception. As early as 1917, Poetzel (1917/1960) had demonstrated, using tachistoscopic presentation of stimuli could influence subsequent content. A basic idea behind New Look research was that considerable cognitive processing goes on before a stimulus is ever consciously perceived. These investigators argued, further, that the emotional content of subliminally perceived stimuli can have an important impact on subsequent thought and behavior. The evidence is now clear that both of these suppositions are correct (Dixon, 1971, 1981; Weinberger, in press).

The research of the New Look was, oddly, dismissed by most psychologists in the late 1950s just as the information-processing perspective, which could have assimilated its findings, began to emerge (see Erdelyi, 1974). Since then, this work has rarely been cited. However, in 1977, Nisbett and Wilson (1977b) demonstrated that people have minimal access to their cognitive processes; that they often "tell more than they can know" about these psychological events; and that the explanations people typically offer about why they did or thought as they did involve application of general attributional knowledge rather than access to their own cognitive processes. One study reported by Nisbett and Wilson documented that subjects are unaware of the activation of associational networks. After learning the word pair ocean—moon, for example, participants were more likely to respond with "Tide" to a question about laundry detergents, even though they had no conscious idea that a network was active and had influenced their response.

In 1980, Shevzin and Dickman marshaled evidence from several fields of research—notably work on selective attention, subliminal perception, and cortical-evoked potentials—to argue that a concept of unconscious psychological processes is both necessary for and implicit in much psychological research and theory. Within four years, two prominent psychologists not identified with psychoanalysis (Bowers & Meichenbaum, 1984) edited a volume entitled The Unconscious Reconsidered and stated unequivocally that unconscious processes pervasively influence thought, feeling, and behavior. Unconscious processes became a fully respectable area of research with the publication in Science of John Kihlstrom's (1987) article on the "cognitive unconscious."

Today, the notion that much of memory and cognition is unconscious is no longer a matter of much debate (Holroyak & Spellman, 1993; Roediger, 1990; Schacter, 1992, 1995; Squire, 1987). Two important forms of implicit memory—that is, memory expressed in behavior rather than in conscious recollection—are associative memory and procedural memory. Associative memory can be observed in priming experiments, as described above, in which prior exposure to the same or related information facilitates the processing of new information. Procedural memory, which refers to "how to" knowledge of procedures or skills useful in various activities, can be seen in everyday activities, such as playing a complex piece of music on the piano, which requires the performer to move her fingers far faster than she can consciously remember how the piece goes or how to play it. Various literatures on thinking have similarly come to distinguish implicit and explicit thought and learning processes (Holroyak & Spellman, 1993; Jacoby & Kelly, 1992; Kihlstrom, 1990; Lewicki, 1986; Reber, 1992; Seger, 1994; Underwood, 1996). These literatures have demonstrated that people can learn to respond to regularities in the environment (such as the tendency of people in a culture to respond in certain ways to people of higher or lower status) without any awareness of these regularities, and that patients with damage to the neural systems involved in conscious recollection or manipulation of ideas can nevertheless respond to environmental contingencies (such as associations between stimuli with pleasure or pain) even without explicit knowledge of those contingencies. In general, for the past decade, cognitive psychology has witnessed a radical shift from serial processing models to parallel processing models that share a central assumption with psychoanalytic theory: that most mental processes occur outside of awareness in parallel rather than one at a time in consciousness.
As we argued in the last edition of this handbook (Westen, 1990a), if serial processing models are inadequate for describing cognitive processes, we have little reason to presume their adequacy for describing affective and motivational processes. Whereas in the early 1990s researchers were largely clear in limiting unconscious processes to unconscious cognition, today the landscape regarding affect and motivation is shifting, just as it did 10 years earlier for cognition. In fact, research has been amassing for years suggesting the importance of unconscious emotional processes, but the zeitgeist did not support this concept until recently, with the growing recognition of the importance of implicit processes more generally (see Greenberg & Safran, 1987; Westen, 1985, 1998).

For example, Broadbent (1977) found many years ago that neutral words were more easily perceived than were unpleasant words, suggesting preconscious processing of the affective significance of stimuli. Moray found that words paired with electric shocks in a classical conditioning procedure altered galvanic skin response (suggesting an emotional reaction) when presented to the unattended ear in a dichotic listening task; although participants never consciously perceived the word that had been "tagged" with fear, presentation of the stimulus produced an emotional response that could be measured physiologically (see Moray, 1969). Subsequent studies have shown that conditioned emotional responses can be both acquired and elicited outside of awareness (see, e.g., Ohman, 1994; Wong, Shevrin, & Williams, 1994). Heinemann and Emrich (1971), studying cortical evoked potentials, found that emotion-laden words presented subliminally elicited significantly greater alpha rhythms than did neutral words even before subjects reported seeing anything, suggesting differential processing of emotional and neutral material outside of awareness. Studies of amnesic patients demonstrate that these patients can retain affective associations without any conscious recollection of having seen the stimulus about which they nevertheless have retained feelings (e.g., Johnson, Kim, & Risse, 1985). Perhaps the most convincing evidence of unconscious affect comes from recent attitude research, which finds that people's implicit and explicit attitudes—including the emotional components of those attitudes—can be very different (e.g., Fazio Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Although many of the studies described above have been conducted by researchers with little interest in psychodynamic ideas, the idea that affective processes activated outside of awareness can influence thought and behavior has been the basis of two major programs of psychoanalytically inspired research using subliminal activation since the 1980s (see Shevrin, Bond, Brakel, Hertel, & Williams, 1996; Silverman & Weinberger, 1985; Weinberger & Silverman, 1988).

The situation is no different with unconscious motivation, which was once seen by most psychologists as a contradiction in terms. At this writing, research is rapidly amassing in support of this key psychoanalytic concept as well. In a classic paper, McClelland, Koestner, and Weiner (1989) reviewed decades of research on self-report and Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) measures of motivation. They found that these two ways of measuring motives—one explicit and the other implicit—rarely correlate with one another, but each has predictable external correlates. For example, over the long run, motives assessed from TAT stories are highly predictive of entrepreneurial or managerial success, whereas self-report measures are not. On the other hand, self-report measures are highly predictive of achievement when people's conscious motives are aroused with instructions such as "You should work really hard on this and do the best you can." These and other data suggest that when conscious motives are activated, they guide behavior. When they are not, which is much of the time, unconscious motives guide behavior. More recently, Bargh (1997; Bargh & Barndollar, 1996) has conducted an extraordinary series of experiments demonstrating unconscious motives, using priming procedures to prime implicit motives just as cognitive psychologists have used these procedures to prime implicit memories.

These propositions about unconscious (implicit) cognitive, affective, and motivational processes have methodological implications that have also not yet been fully appreciated. The methods used in most studies of personality, which tend to rely heavily on self-report data, were crafted long before the 1990s, when what might be called the "second cognitive revolution" ushered in this new wave of research on unconscious cognitive processes. Self-report methods implicitly presume that people are aware of most of what is important about their personalities—either that they have direct access to it or that they are likely to observe enough of
their own behaviors to hold empirically viable views of themselves. If psychoanalytic theory turns out to have been right that (1) much of what we think and do is determined unconsciously and (2) affective and motivational processes can be unconscious, this will likely require a paradigm shift in the way we study personality. We suspect, in fact, that in the first decade of the 21st century, personality researchers studying individual differences will routinely include implicit and explicit measures of the same constructs, and that these implicit and explicit measures will generally show moderate correlations with one another but will also independently predict relevant criterion variables.

The Inner World

By 1914, Freud had begun to recognize the extent to which the people who inhabit our minds—ghosts from the past as well as goblins from the present—influence who we are and what we do. As described earlier, this emphasis on "internal objects"—mental representations of the self, others, and relationships—became the cornerstone of object relations theories of personality.

As with unconscious processes, this view is no longer so distinctive of psychoanalytic approaches. George Kelly’s (1955) approach to personality had similar elements, as do contemporary social-cognitive approaches. One of the features that remains distinctive about object relations approaches, however, is the presumed complexity of these representations and the pervasiveness of the cognitive, affective, and behavioral precipitates of childhood attachment relationships in adult relationship patterns.

Empirical Studies of Object Relations

Object relations theory has served as the major impetus to psychoanalytically inspired research since the 1980s, much of it relying on projective data. Although in previous eras this would have disqualified such research from serious consideration in the minds of many personality psychologists, social-cognitive research (Barth, 1984; Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982) suggests that chronically activated or accessible categories developed through experience are readily employed in the processing of social stimuli; in turn, this suggests that the characters subjects see in the Rorschach or the TAT are likely to bear the imprint of enduring cognitive-affective processes and structures. Indeed, the recent explosion of research on implicit processes, and the emergence of research on individual differences in implicit associations (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998), suggests that measures applied to projective data may have considerably more validity than once presumed (Westen, Feit, & Zittel, 1999).

Mayman (1967, 1968) argued that the affective quality and cognitive structure of representations of self and others may be examined through projective tests. He hypothesized that the extent to which individuals describe characters who are psychologically rich, differentiated, and interacting in benign ways should predict relative psychological health and capacity for intimacy. Research since Mayman’s initial studies, primarily by Mayman and his students (e.g., Kohn & Mayman, 1974; Shedler, Mayman, & Manis, 1993; Urist, 1980) and by Blatt at Yale, has consistently confirmed this hypothesis. Blatt and his colleagues (Blatt, Brenneis, & Schimeck, 1976, 1983, 1991) have carried out an extensive program of research measuring several dimensions of object relations from Rorschach responses. They have found predicted differences among various clinical and normal populations, as well as developmental changes through adolescence. Blatt has also developed a scale for assessing dimensions of object relations from free-response descriptions of significant others (Blatt, Auerbach, & Levy, 1997; Blatt, Wein, Chevron, & Quinlan, 1979; Levy, Blatt, & Shaver, 1998), which assesses dimensions such as the cognitive or conceptual level of representations and the degrees of ambivalence and malevolence expressed toward the person. Blatt’s methods reflect an attempt to integrate psychoanalytic object relations theories with Wernerian and Piagetian cognitive-developmental theories. Blatt has also developed an approach to depression grounded in object relations theory, which distinguishes self-critical and dependent styles (Blatt & Zuroff, 1992).

Another program of research, developed by Westen and colleagues, reflects an integration of object relations theory and research in social cognition (e.g., Westen, 1990b, 1991; Westen, Lohr et al., 1990). In this research they have used TAT stories and individuals’ descriptions of salient interpersonal episodes to assess working representations—that is, momentarily active representations that shape thought and behavior, rather than the conscious, prototypical representations elicited by questions such as “De-
scribe yourself” or “Do you think people can usually be trusted?” Most of this research has focused on five dimensions: complexity of representations of people; affective quality of relationship paradigms (the extent to which the person expects megalomane and pain or benevolence and pleasure in relationships); capacity for emotional investment in relationships; capacity for emotional investment in ideals and moral standards; and social causality (the ability to tell logical and coherent narratives about interpersonal events, reflecting an understanding of why people do what they do). More recently, Westen and colleagues have added four additional variables: self-esteem, identity and coherence of sense of self, regulation of interpersonal aggression, and dominant interpersonal concerns (thematic content) (see Conklin & Westen, in press; Westen, 1999). A number of studies have found predicted differences among various patient groups (e.g., Fowler, Hilsenroth, & Handler, 1996; Hibbard, Hilsenroth, Hibbard, & Nash, 1995; Porcerelli, Hill, & Dauphin, 1995; Westen et al., 1990), and developmental studies have documented developmental differences between 2nd and 5th graders and between 9th and 12th graders, as predicted (Westen, Klepser, Ruffins et al., 1991).

Attachment Research and Internal Working Models

A major development in the empirical study of object relations is attachment research, based on Bowlby’s (1969, 1973, 1982) integration of psychoanalysis, ethology, and systems theory. Ainsworth (1979; Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978) developed a procedure for measuring different styles of secure and insecure attachment in infancy. Subsequent research has found these to be predictive of later adjustment and interpersonal styles in the school years (see Bremerton, 1985; Stroff & Fleeson, 1986), and to be influenced substantially by the quality of the primary caretakers’ relatedness to the child (see De Wolff & van IJzendoorn, 1997; Howes, Hamilton, & Philipson, 1998; Hicks, 1985; Steele, Steele, and Fonagy, 1996).

A quantum leap in our understanding of the ramifications of early attachment was made possible by the development of instruments for assessing adult attachment, particularly the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI), created by Main and her colleagues (Main & Goldwin, 1991). This interview elicits information about the way individuals recall separation and attachment experiences as they describe significant events with attachment figures. Transcripts are coded for four styles of responding, which are analogous to infant attachment classifications: secure or autonomous; anxious or preoccupied with attachment; avoidant or dismissive of attachment; and unresolved with respect to loss or trauma. AAI attachment classification of parents (in relation to their own attachment figures) has proven highly predictive of the attachment status of their children, providing important data on the intergenerational transmission of attachment (Fonagy et al., 1991a; Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985; Main, 1990; Steele, Steele & Fonagy, 1996). Self-report measures of adult attachment have also produced important findings in dozens of studies (e.g., Mikulincer, 1998a, 1998b; Mikulincer, Kessler, & Shaver, 1997), although narrative and self-report measures tend, as in other areas of research, not to be highly correlated, and researchers are just beginning to tease apart what the two types of instruments may be measuring (see Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998).

Although Bowlby’s work was once outside the mainstream of psychoanalytic thought, the recent surge of empirical work on attachment is having a significant impact on psychoanalytic theories of development. A prime example is the work of Fonagy and colleagues (1991b), who have developed a scale for assessing “reflective self-function,” designed to be used with AAI data, which assesses the individual’s capacity to understand and reflect upon psychological states. Empirical research using both the standard AAI classification system and Fonagy’s measure have supported many of Bowlby’s ideas about links between attachment and adult psychopathology (Fonagy et al., 1996). For example, Fonagy’s work suggests a link between serious maltreatment in childhood and difficulties with reflective self-function. According to Fonagy, abused children may learn to avoid thinking about their abusive caregivers’ inner worlds so as not to have to consider why the caregiver would wish to harm them. As a result, these children grow up with an incapacity to understand mental states in themselves and others. This research dovetails with research on object relations in adults and adolescents with borderline personality disorder and with histories of abuse, who show deficits, for example, in the
complexity of their representations or the understanding of social causality (Nigg et al., 1992; Westen et al., 1990).

Transference

One of Freud’s most important discoveries, of relevance to object relations theory, was his concept of “transference,” the displacement of thoughts, feelings, wishes, and interactional patterns from childhood figures onto people in adulthood (Freud, 1912/1958). Two programs of research have provided important insight into transferential processes. Luborsky and colleagues (Luborsky, Crits-Christoph, & Mellon, 1986; Luborsky & Crits-Christoph, 1996) have analyzed core conflictual relationship themes in patients’ narratives, particularly as assessed from psychotherapy transcripts. Among other findings, Luborsky and colleagues have demonstrated, as Freud proposed, that core relationship themes expressed toward the therapist are associated with similar themes that occur outside of the treatment relationship.

Andersen and colleagues have approached transferential processes in an entirely different way, using methods and concepts from social cognition to study transference processes experimentally. For example, Andersen and Cole (1991) asked participants to describe significant others and then embedded descriptions from their responses in descriptions of fictional characters. When subsequently asked to describe the characters, participants mistakenly attributed traits to the characters that were part of their schemas of the significant other but were not originally included in the character’s description. More recently, she and her colleagues have documented the transference of affect from significant others to descriptions of unknown others allegedly seated next door (Andersen and Baum, 1994), have shown that these affective evaluations lead to transference of motives (Andersen, Reznik, & Manzella, 1996), and have demonstrated unconscious transferential processes of this sort through subliminal presentation of significant-other descriptors (Glassman, 1997).

Methodological Implications

Some of the central claims of psychoanalytic object relations theories—such as the theory that as adults we live with representations, motives, defenses, and interpersonal strategies forged in significant relationships from the past, and that many of these psychological processes emerge in our behavior without our knowledge of them—have substantial methodological implications. One of the most important is that people are likely to reveal important aspects of their inner worlds through their associations, ways of interacting with others (particularly with people who are emotionally significant), and narratives about themselves and significant interpersonal events. As we have seen, several bodies of research are now converging on the finding that what people reveal about their internal experience of the self and others explicitly through conscious self-reports and what they reveal implicitly through narratives or other tasks that provide access to their associational networks are often very different. Enduring object relational patterns can also be ascertained through the patterns of feeling and behavior people draw from others—for example, in the role relationships in which they manage to get others to engage (Sandler, 1976; Wachtel, 1997)—which is a central feature of contemporary views of countertransference (Tansey & Burke, 1989). What this means is that we may need to broaden substantially the ways we assess personality, relying on multiple methods and measures rather than those that are relatively quick and easily administered, which may provide a window to only one aspect of people’s experience of the self and others.

The Bodily, the Animal, and the Uncomfortable

Psychoanalysis repeatedly leads one to think about what one does not wish to think about. It is an approach to personality that one does not care to discuss with one’s mother. Motivation and fantasy are rich and sometimes aggressive, socially grossly inappropriate, or perverse, and any theory that is entirely comfortable to discuss is probably missing something very important about what it means to be human.

A good example is social learning research on the influence of television aggression on children’s behavior. This research is important and suggestive, but it fails to ask a crucial question: Why is it that aggressive television shows appeal to people so much? Would Freud be surprised to learn that the two variables that censors keep an eye on in television shows and movies are sex and aggression? One can read a thousand pages
of the best social-cognitive work on personality and never know that people have genitals—or, for that matter, that they have bodies—let alone fantasies.

One of us (D. W.) once evaluated a patient who had been treated for his "poor social skills" and difficulties in his marriage for a year by a cognitive-behavioral therapist, who sent a glowing report of his progress in his treatment. Within the first session, however, he disclosed that he had had active fantasies of raping and murdering her, which were clearly tied to a core sexual fantasy that was troubling him in his relationship with his wife. His therapist did not know about this fantasy, because, the patient noted with a sly shrug, "she never asked." Psychoanalysis is the only theory of personality that suggests why one might want to ask.

Another example is Freud's psychosexual hypotheses. No doubt, many of his theories of development were off-base, such as his view that penis envy is the central psychological event in a young girl's personality development (see Fisher & Greenberg, 1985, 1996). On the other hand, Freudian psychosexual theory can often provide a compelling explanation of phenomena from everyday life about which competing theories can offer no rival explanations. For example, if readers try generating for themselves a list of all the profanities they can call a person, they will notice an overrepresentation of Freud's erogenous zones. Indeed, the worst name a person in our culture can call another person has a distinctly Oedipal ring (Sophocles, circa 300 B.C.) and we doubt this term came to the United States via the Viennese doctor.

**Defensive Processes**

From the start, a central assumption of psychoanalytic theory and technique has focused on the pervasive nature of human self-deception. Whether this takes the form of simple ablation of material from consciousness (as in repression and denial), turning feelings or beliefs into their opposite (as in reaction formation), manipulating arguments or perceptions so that they point to the desired conclusion, or sundry other ways, from a psychodynamic point of view, every act of cognition is simultaneously an act of affect regulation (Westen & Feit, 1999).

A wealth of research now provides incontrovertible evidence for the existence of defensive processes, by which people adjust their conscious thoughts and feelings in an effort to maximize positive affect and minimize negative affect (see Conte & Plutchik, 1995; Haan, 1977; Paulhus, Frithhandler, & Hayes, 1997; Perry & Cooper, 1987; Plutchik, 1998; Vaillant, 1992; Westen, 1998a). In the 1950s and 1960s, Blum and his students (see Blum, 1968) used hypnotic procedures, typically in combination with a projective task in which subjects responded to pictures of a cartoon dog ("Blacky") in various psychoanalytically relevant situations, to test hypotheses about defensive processes. For example, in a fascinating unpublished doctoral dissertation, Hedegard (1969) induced anxiety hypnotically, and asked participants before and after anxiety induction to choose captions to the Blacky pictures. Supporting the notion that defenses form a hierarchy of relative adaptiveness, Hedegard found that higher levels of anxiety elicited less mature defenses.

The concept of hierarchical levels of defenses, originally developed by Anna Freud (1936), has been refined and studied empirically by Vaillant (1977, 1992), who has made some of the major empirical contributions to the concept of defense. Theoretically, defenses involving rigidly held and gross distortions of reality are viewed as more pathological, and hence are expected to be used with much greater frequency by individuals with severe character pathology or by relatively healthy people in times of severe stress (e.g., bereaved individuals who imagine the presence of recently deceased love ones). For example, individuals with narcissistic personality disorders may find even minor inadequacies so intolerable that they must externalize the causes of any failure or project any impulse that threatens their tenuous self-esteem. Recent research, in fact, supports such a view, linking particular defensive styles to particular types and levels of personality disturbance (Perry & Cooper, 1989; Vaillant & Drake, 1985; Westen, Muderrisoglu, Fowler, Shedler, & Koren, 1997; Westen & Shedler, 1999a).

Other researchers studying defensive processes have converged on a defensive style that has adverse impact on physical health. Weinberger and colleagues (Weinberger, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1979; Weinberger, 1995) isolated individuals who simultaneously report a low level of distress on the Taylor Manifest Anxiety scale and a high level of social desirability, defensiveness, or over-control as measured by the Marlowe-Crowne scale (Crowne & Marlow, 1964). These "repressors" (low anxiety, high social desirability) are distinguished from other subjects by, among other
things, greater reaction time when confronted with sexual and aggressive verbal stimuli; more difficulty retrieving unpleasant childhood memories; and health risks linked to hyperactivity to potentially stressful events (e.g., Bonnano & Singer, 1995; Brown et al., 1996; Davis & Schwartz, 1987). Shedler, Mayman, & Manis (1993) have isolated a related group of individuals who report minimal emotional disturbance on standard self-report measures such as Eysenck's Neuroticism scale but whose narratives of early experience (early memories) manifest distress or a lack of narrative coherence. In a series of studies, Shedler and colleagues found that, when presented with a stressful or mildly threatening task (such as telling TAT stories), these individuals were hyperreactive on a combined index of heart rate and blood pressure used by cardiologists and empirically related to heart disease. Furthermore, although these individuals self-reported less subjective anxiety, their verbal productions revealed significantly more manifestations of anxiety (laughing, sighing, stuttering, blocking, avoiding the content of the stimulus, etc.) than individuals whose narratives and self-reports were concordant—that is, who were either genuinely distressed or genuinely nondistressed.

**Conflict and Ambivalence**

Another enduring contribution of psychoanalysis is the concept of intrapsychic conflict. From the start, Freud emphasized that nothing about the mind requires that any given stimulus be associated exclusively or primarily with one feeling, and that our experiences with anyone of significance to us are likely to be mixed. What led Freud to this view was not only his clinical experience, in which he observed people who seemed to be in turmoil when their wishes came into conflict with their moral standards, but a remarkably modern, modular view of the mind as comprising relatively independent dynamisms that can be operative outside of awareness.

A substantial body of research has begun to emerge across a number of areas of psychology documenting the importance of conflict and ambivalence in human psychology (see Westen, 1998). For example, many attitude researchers in social psychology (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997; Prinstein & Petty, 1996) now suggest that attitudes may be better conceived as including two distinct evaluative dimensions, positive and negative, than as bipolar (and hence measurable using Likert scales running from negative to positive). The reason is that the same attitude object can engender both positive and negative feelings, which can be relatively independent and can vary in strength. Low positive/low negative attitudes tend to have minimal impact on behavior because they leave the person neutrally inclined toward a person, product, political issue, or other attitude object. Low positive/low negative attitudes are, empirically, very different from high positive/high negative (ambivalent) attitudes, which nonetheless yield similar, moderate scores on traditional bipolar attitude measures. For example, when people have fallen out of love and mourned the end of the relationship, their feelings toward each other may be relatively neutral. Months earlier, their feelings may have been intensely ambivalent, leading to the experience of tremendous conflict, psychosomatic symptoms, anxiety, and so forth. In both cases, the person's attitude might be expressed as midway between positive and negative, but surely this would mask the difference between having "gotten over" the relationship and being in the midst of psychological turmoil about it.

The literature on ambivalence is consistent with research suggesting that positive and negative affect are only moderately negatively correlated—that is, that people who often feel good may also often feel bad—and are mediated by different neural circuits (see, e.g., Davidson, 1992; Gray, 1990). Indeed, several literatures are independently converging on the notion that positive and negative interpersonal interactions, and their attendant feelings, are only moderately correlated and have distinct correlates. Developmental research suggests that supportive and harsh parenting, for example, do not appear to be opposite ends of a continuum. Rather, they correlate only imperfectly with each other and each predict unique components of the variance in children's adjustment (Petrie, Bates, & Dodge, 1997). Some parents can be harsh but can also be loving; others, who might receive a similar rating on the overall affective quality of their parenting, can be distant but not overtly punishing. These distinct parenting styles are likely to have very different consequences. Similarly, in-group favoritism and out-group derogation are not simply opposite sides of the same coin (Brewer & Brown, 1998). In most situations, in-group favoritism is more common than out-group derogation. Indeed, a subtle form of racism or group antagonism may lie less in the
presence of hostile feelings than in the absence of the positive feelings that normally bind people together (Petrigrew & Meertens, 1995).

Positivity and negativity in dyadic relationships also appear to be distinct. In children, warm, positive interactions are only somewhat negatively correlated with negative or conflictual interactions; some durable friendships are more passionate all the way around (Flarrup, 1998). A recent study of couples (Arkowitz-Westen, 1998) similarly found only a moderate negative correlation between acceptance and mutual validation in marital couples and the extent to which their relationship was permeated by hostility and cycles of negative reciprocity, in which conflicts escalate rather than resolve. Indeed, acceptance and negative reciprocity independently contributed to measures of relationship satisfaction. (Further, in support of research described earlier documenting a distinction between implicit and explicit affective processing, acceptance coded from videotapes of couples' interactions with each other—that is, as expressed in their behavior—accounted for variences in couples' satisfaction above and beyond self-reported acceptance.)

The Concept of Personality Structure

Central to psychoanalytic approaches to personality is the concept of personality organization or structure. A search for simple behavioral regularities is likely to miss much about human beings that is important because qualitatively different behaviors can stem from the same structure (see Stroufe & Waters, 1977). Several studies using Q-sort methods have attempted to operationalize this construct (Block, 1971; Block & Block, 1980; Westen & Shedler, 1999). A study from Jack Block's longitudinal project is instructive in this respect. Shedler and Block (1990) found a systematic relationship between patterns of drug use at age 18, personality as assessed by Q-sort at age 18, personality as assessed in childhood, and quality of parenting as assessed at age 5. The investigators did not find a simple linear relation between drug use (from none to plenty) on the one hand, and personality characteristics or parenting styles on the other. Participants who had experimented with marijuana were the most well-adjusted in the sample, compared with those who had never tried the drug (who were described by Q-sort as relatively anxious, emotionally constricted, and lacking in social skills) and those who abused marijuana (who were observed to be alienated and impulsive). Mothers of both the abstainers and the abusers had been previously rated as relatively cold and unresponsive.

As the authors point out, in the context of a relatively intact, flexible personality structure that permits experimentation and individuation in adolescence, drug use may be relatively healthy, depending on the historical and cultural moment. Educational or social learning approaches that focus on peer pressure as a primary cause of adolescent drug abuse and attempt to teach teenagers about the problems with drugs may be missing the point (and have proven, empirically, to be of little value in the long run; see Klepp & Keider, 1995) because of their focus on discrete behaviors divorced from the personality structure in which they are embedded. The learning of behaviors occurs within the context of a personality structure, including characteristic ways of coping with and defending against impulses and affects; perceiving the self and others; obtaining satisfaction of one's wishes and desires; responding to environmental demands; and finding meaning in one's activities, values, and relationships. Educational and social learning approaches also seriously underestimate the extent to which underlying personality dispositions influence what are often treated as "independent variables," such as the peers with whom adolescents choose to associate and by whom they are pressured, which in turn influence subsequent responses (see Wachtel, 1987).

Viewing the Present in the Context of the Past

Axiomatic for psychoanalytic accounts of any mental or behavioral event is that current psychological processes must be viewed in the context of their development. Psychological experience is assumed to be so rich, and current thoughts, feelings, and actions are presumed to be so densely interconnected with networks of association at various levels of consciousness developed over time, that studying an adult form without its developmental antecedents is like trying to make sense of current politics without any knowledge of their history.

This does not mean that psychoanalytic theory is wedded to a psychosocial determinism that is difficult to maintain in the face of research in behavioral genetics (e.g., Plomin, DeFries, McClearn, & Rutter, 1997). Nothing about a psychodynamic theory of the development of any adult psychological tendency, such
nings, rely exclusively or in part on psychodynamic conceptualizations (Pope, Tabachnick, & Keith-Spiegel, 1987), whereas most experimentalists remain dubious of psychodynamic propositions. Learning to listen psychoanalytically and to interpret meanings in this manner requires years of experience and supervision, just as does learning to design and conduct valid experiments.

Of course, the “art” inherent in interpretation is precisely what has set the postmodern cat out of the bag in psychoanalysis. This does not mean, however, that meaning cannot be coded with some reliability, or that there are no principles that can be used to recognize salient themes (see Alexander, 1988; Demorest & Siegel, 1996, Westen & Shedler, 1999a). In everyday life, we decode meaning all the time, and much of the time lay observers reach considerable consensus on what they have observed. The same is true when researchers apply coding systems to narratives in an effort to quantify either thematic content or structural aspects of the narrative that provide insight into what the person may be implicitly thinking or feeling—that is, meaning. From a methodological standpoint, the recognition that humans inherently attach meaning to their experiences, and that these meanings affect the way they behave, once again suggests limits to approaches that take people’s responses—even their responses to highly structured stimuli, such as questionnaires—at face value.

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PSYCHOLOGY: EMERGING AREAS OF INTEGRATION

As recently as the early 1980s, psychoanalysis and empirical psychology had little contact. The contact remains too sparse on both sides, but it is steadily increasing (see Barron, Eagle, & Wolitzky, 1992; Westen, 1998a). Here we briefly describe two potentially important domains in which integration is increasingly occurring: cognitive science and neuroscience, and evolutionary approaches to psychology.

Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Psychoanalysis

Freud’s “cognitive psychology” was extensive (see Erdelyi, 1985). His distinction between “primary-process” thought, which is organized by associations rather than by logic, and “secondary-process” thought, which is more rational and directed by conscious concerns, is similar in many respects to contemporary distinctions between controlled and automatic information processing and serial and parallel processing. However, an important difference between psychoanalytic and contemporary cognitive approaches to thought and memory is that the former were tied from the start to considerations of affect, cognitive-affective interaction, and consciousness. For psychoanalysis, it is axiomatic that cognition is largely if not entirely in the service of affective and motivational processes, and that needs, wishes, and conflicts are involved in categorizing and selecting information to be consciously perceived and processed. As we will see, the recent shift from a computer metaphor to a brain metaphor in cognitive science may allow a rapprochement between psychodynamic ideas about motivated cognition and information-processing models of perception, thought, and memory. The reason is that brains, unlike computers, process fears, wishes, and other feelings.

Thought Disorder and the Menninger Group

A major impetus for psychoanalytic investigations of thinking in the middle of the 20th century was the attempt to understand disordered thought in patients with schizophrenia. Rapaport and his colleagues (see Allison, Blatt, & Zimet, 1968; Rapaport, 1951; Rapaport, Gill & Schafer, 1945–1946) painstakingly analyzed the verbatim psychological testing protocols of hundreds of institutionalized patients, in an attempt to categorize the pathologic processes characterizing schizophrenic thought. For example, they found, from examination of Rorschach responses, that psychotic patients frequently contaminated one percept with another; that is, they superimposed one percept on another without recognizing the impossibility of the superimposition. Such patients were also found to make logical errors and category errors of various sorts, and to suffer from associative intrusions (see Coleman, Levy, Lenzenweger, & Holzman, 1996; Johnson & Holzman, 1979). Subsequent research on thought disorder in patients with borderline personality disorder has found more attenuated forms of thought disturbance, such as egocentric or fanciful elaborations and intrusions of aggressive content into perceptions (see Gartner, Hurt, & Gartner, 1987). To our knowledge, no one has to date integrated these various
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observations with contemporary cognitive models, although they may provide insight into the nature of both well-ordered and disordered cognitive processes.

Information Processing and Psychoanalysis

A growing number of psychoanalytically oriented researchers and clinicians have attempted to bring psychoanalytic theory together with contemporary cognitive science. In a rarely cited but important book, Blum (1961) developed a model of cognitive-dynamic interactions, based on systematic experimental research using hypnosis. Relying upon a computer model similar to the emerging models that guided the cognitive revolution in the 1960s, Blum described networks of association, which he related to neural circuits; elaborated a theory of spreading activation (which he described as ‘reverberation’ from an activated node in a network to related representations); described networks linking cognitive and affective representations; discussed cognitively controlled inhibitory mechanisms responsible for repression; and used an experimental paradigm for exploring cognitive-affective interactions that predated similar work in cognitive psychology by 20 years.

Beginning in the 1960s, several theorists have attempted to bring together psychodynamic concepts of motivation and affect with various mainstream approaches to cognition. Shared by all of these approaches was an attention to cognitive-affective interactions. For example, a number of theorists attempted to wed psychoanalytic and Piagetian notions, exploring the interaction of the child's developing understanding of the self, others, and the world with evolving wishes and fears (e.g., Basch, 1977; Fast, 1985; Greenspan, 1979; Wolff, 1960). Others have offered potential integrations of psychodynamic concepts of conflict, defense, and motivation with information-processing approaches to cognition, focusing on concepts such as networks of association and cognitive-affective schemas (Bucci, 1997; Erdelyi, 1985; Horowitz, 1987, 1988, 1998; Peterfreund, 1971; Shevrin et al., 1996; Bonanno & Singer, 1995; Singer & Salloway, 1993; Westen, 1985, 1994, in press-a).

Of particular importance today for potential integrations of psychodynamic and cognitive approaches is the rise of connectionist models in cognitive science (Rumelhart, McClelland, & the PDP Research Group, 1986; Smith, 1998). These models diverge from the information-processing models that dominated cognitive psychology for three decades in multiple respects: (1) They assume that most information processing occurs outside of awareness, in parallel; (2) they view representations as distributed throughout a network of neural units, each of which attends to some part of the representation; (3) they view knowledge as residing in associative links established through repeated coactivation, such that activation of one node in a network can either facilitate or inhibit nodes associatively linked to it; (4) they propose an equilibration model of cognition involving parallel constraint satisfaction, in which the brain simultaneously and unconsciously processes multiple features of a stimulus or situation; and (5) they rely on the metaphor of mind as brain, rather than mind as computer.

These models are of particular relevance because they suggest that conscious perception, memory, and thought occur through the collaboration and competition of multiple processes outside of awareness. Whereas connectionist models focus on parallel satisfaction of cognitive constraints—that is, "data" as represented by processing units within the brain—psychoanalytic theories of conflict and compromise focus on the way thoughts and behaviors reflect a similar equilibration process involving feelings and motives (see Westen, 1998a, in press-a; Westen & Feit, 1999). An integrated model might suggest, instead, that most of the time our beliefs and inferences reflect a process of parallel constraint satisfaction that includes both cognitive and affective constraints, such that we tend to make judgments or inferences that best fit the data only to the extent that we are indifferent about the solutions to which our minds equilibrate. In everyday life, we are rarely so indifferent. Thus, our judgments and beliefs tend to reflect the activation and inhibition of neural networks not only by the data of observation but also by their affective quality. In other words, we see ourselves and others as accurately as we can within the constraints imposed by our wishes, fears, and values.

Neuroscience and Psychoanalysis

A growing area of interface with psychoanalysis is neuroscience. Freud was himself a neurologist, and his theories were developed in the context of his understanding of the nervous system (Pribram & Gill, 1976). His structural model of the mind is in many ways compatible with contem-
porary conceptualizations of the structure and evolution of the nervous system. Freud viewed the ego and superego as regulatory structures superimposed on the more phylogenetically and ontogenetically primitive id, and argued that our fundamental motivational structures are little different from those of other animals. From a neuropsychological perspective, the primitive brainstem of humans is indeed difficult to distinguish from the brain stem of many other animals; the central differences between humans and other animals lie in the evolution of the cerebrum, and particularly the cortex. The nervous system does appear to be organized hierarchically, with progressive regulation and inhibition of primitive motivational and behavioral tendencies exercised through development of higher cortical centers (see Kolb & Wishaw, 1985; Luria, 1962).

Increasing understanding of the relations among hypothalamic, limbic, and cortical structures in motivation (see LeDoux, 1995) is likely to lead to a better understanding of the relation between drive, affect, and conditioning on the one hand, and motivational states mediated by more complex cognitive processes on the other. Work in this area was just beginning when it was summarized in the first edition of this handbook (e.g., Cooper, 1984; Hadley, 1983; Miller, 1986; Reiser, 1984; Schwartz, 1987; Winson, 1985). The extraordinary advances in understanding of neural functioning that have come about in the 1990s because of the development of more and more sophisticated neuroimaging techniques promise to expand this area of inquiry tremendously within the early years of the 21st century (e.g., Miller, 1997; Pribram, 1998; Schore, 1994; Solms, 1996).

Evolutionary Psychology and Psychoanalysis

One of the major developments today in contemporary psychology is the return of evolutionary thinking (Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & Wakefield, 1998), which dominated functionalist theories and approaches to motivation at the turn of the 20th century and has now been invigorated by developments in Darwinian thinking since the rise of “sociobiology” in the 1960s (Williams, 1966) and 1970s (Trivers, 1971; Wilson, 1976). In some respects, a link between psychoanalysis and evolutionary theory is natural, given that Freud was born the year of the publication of the Origin of Species (1859) and was deeply influenced by Darwinian thinking. Freud, like Darwin, was writing at a time prior to the recognition of the importance for natural selection of Gregor Mendel’s work on genetics, but his drive theory reflected his understanding of the importance of sexual motivation and intraspecific competition, particularly for mates. Yet Freud never thought to evaluate his ideas systematically in relation to Darwinian thinking, proposing concepts such as the “death instinct” that were evolutionarily untenable.

The first evolutionary approaches in psychoanalysis were arguably the writings of the ego psychologists, who emphasized the development of ego functions that foster adaptation to the natural and social environments (Hartmann, 1939/1958). For many years, however, the primary psychoanalytic voices heralding an integration of psychoanalysis and evolutionary thinking were Robert Plutchik (1980, 1998), John Bowlby (1973), and Robert LeVine (1982). Plutchik proposed an evolutionary theory of emotion and defense, which stressed the adaptive nature of human emotions and the way individuals develop defenses to cope with particular emotions. Bowlby focused on attachment-related motives and emotions, drawing links between the primate literature on imprinting and the psychoanalytic literature on the effects of maternal deprivation and disturbances in the attachment relationship on subsequent development. Bowlby explicitly argued for the origin of object-relational strivings in the infant’s immaturity and need for security. LeVine (1982), in work that has not yet been fully integrated into the mainstream, came at evolutionary theory from a different angle, focusing on the natural selection of cultural practices.

Since that time, evolutionary thinking has begun to creep into the psychoanalytic literature, though only slowly. One of the first thoroughgoing attempts to wed psychodynamic and evolutionary accounts was Westen’s (1985) book on personality and culture, which drew on the work of Plutchik, Bowlby, and LeVine, and explicitly addressed the implications of then-recent work in sociobiology for personality theory. Westen argued that emotions were naturally selected adaptations that themselves perform the function of “naturally selecting” thoughts, feelings, and actions that foster adaptation. In this view, emotions and sensory feeling states evolved to lead people toward ways of thinking and behaving that maximize survival and reproduction and lead them away from pain-inducing acts that, in
aggregate, tend to be maladaptive. Mental processes and behaviors associated with pain tend to be punished, whereas those leading to pleasure and goal-attainment are reinforced. From this point of view, pathology of affect regulation and motivation often involves the maladaptive use of mechanisms "designed" by nature to foster adaptation (such as avoidance of threats or stimuli associated with anxiety). Further, Westen proposed two constellations of motives—self-oriented and other-oriented—derived from evolutionary theory, which resemble concepts such as Bakan's distinction of motives for agency and communion and Blatt's body of theory and research on introjective and anaclitic modes (see Güssinger & Blatt, 1994). More recently, Slavin and Krieger (1992) and Badcock (1994) have been developing self-consciously evolutionary approaches to psychoanalysis, and Wakefield (1992) has applied evolutionary theory to concepts of dysfunction in clinical psychology.

So what might a psychodynamic account of personality look like 100 years after Freud began his inquiries and nearly 150 years after Darwin's *Origin of Species*? Here we briefly outline the directions an evolutionarily informed psychodynamic point of view might take. Humans are organisms endowed through natural selection with motives, feelings, cognitive processes, and behaviors—and the capacity to develop these processes through learning—that foster survival, adaptation, reproduction, and concern for the well-being of significant others. Biologically, we are all endowed with processes that serve self-preservation, sexual, and social functions that we cannot escape because they are built into our brains and our guts. We need to eat, to drink, to have sex, to form attachments and affiliative relationships with others, to nurture the next generation, and to experience ourselves and be viewed by others as important and worthwhile. Pursuit of these motives often entails expressing aggression or seeking dominance because status, sexual access to attractive others, and in some ecological circumstances, survival, necessarily engender clashes between relationship seeking on the one hand, and self-interest or the interest of others in whose welfare we are emotionally invested on the other. To what extent aggression and sadism can be gratifying in and of themselves, and if so why we evolved that way, remains unclear. The motives that drive people reflect universal biology, biologically and environmentally influenced gender differences, individual differences in genotype, culturally norma-

tive experiences, and idiosyncratic personal experience and associations. Thus, the strength of various motivations, and the extent to which they are compatible with one another, vary across individuals.

Conflict between motives is built into human life for at least three reasons. First, naturally selected motive systems at times inevitably come into conflict. Whether the conflict is a struggle between two good friends over the affection of a potential love object or the conflict between two siblings for their mothers' attention, there is no innate requirement of human motives that they be harmonious. A second and related factor is our tendency to internalize the needs and motives of significant others as our own. We care about the welfare of people with whom we interact closely, particularly those to whom we are attached, so that their motives become, to a greater or lesser extent, our motives. Once inside us, either as wishes for their happiness and relief of their pain, or as the set of moral standards Freud called the superego, these motives will inevitably conflict at times with our own personal desires. Third, one of the primary mechanisms that evolved in humans and other animals to register the effects of prior experience is associative learning. In the course of daily life, we associate any frequently encountered person or stimulus with whatever emotions the person or object engenders. Thus, over time, our representations of anything or anyone who is significant in our lives will be ambivalent, and different situations and associations will trigger different, and sometimes conflicting, affective reactions.

Organisms survived for millions of years without consciousness. Precisely when consciousness as we think of it arose evolutionarily is unknown and depends substantially on how one defines it. Yet millions of years before the evolution of consciousness, organisms learned to avoid aversive stimuli and seek rewarding ones that fostered survival and reproduction. With the development of limbic structures, most adaptively significant learning came to involve feeling states of pleasure, pain, and more specific emotions. Nothing in the architecture of the human brain requires that these feeling states be conscious in order for us to associate them with stimuli or to develop motives to avoid or approach stimuli associated with them. With the evolution of the neocortex, the capacity to form associations expanded dramatically, as did the ability to plan, remember, and make conscious choices and decisions. Yet most associations, cognitive patterns,
decisions, and plans occur outside awareness; we simply could not attend to all the motives relevant to adaptation at any given moment because we have limited working-memory capacity. The function of consciousness is to focus attention on stimuli that are potentially adaptively significant and require more processing than can be carried out unconsciously and automatically. Often this means that consciousness is drawn to anomalies, affectively significant stimuli, and stimuli that are salient because of their familiarity or unfamiliarity.

Consciousness of feeling states is a useful guide to the potential significance of environmental events, internal processes, and possible courses of action. The downside of conscious emotion, however, is that we can experience emotional pain. Where possible, people tend to respond at any given moment by trying to solve problems of adaptation directly. Under three circumstances, however, they tend, instead, to alter their conscious cognitive or affective states or keep certain mental contents out of awareness that are nonetheless adaptively significant. First, when circumstances do not allow control over painful circumstances, people turn to coping and defensive strategies that protect them from the conscious experience of mental and physical pain, such as dissociation during sexual abuse or torture, or denial in the face of abandonment by a love object. Second, people routinize many affect-regulatory procedures, just as they routinize other forms of procedural knowledge (such as tying their shoes), during childhood. To the extent that childhood cognition places limits on the affect-regulatory procedures that become selected and routinized, and to the extent that these routinized procedures interfere with learning of more adaptive procedures, people will regulate their affects using unconscious procedures that prevent certain ideas, feelings, or motives from becoming conscious. Third, to the extent that consciousness of a thought, feeling, or desire conflicts with other powerful goals, such as moral standards or wishes, defensive distortion of conscious representations is likely to result.

Humans are not born as adults. They have a longer apprenticeship at the hands of parental figures than members of other species, and their experience in these hands influences their beliefs, expectations, feelings, motives, and behaviors. Their caretaking environment is not independent of their actions; what they experience involves a transaction between their own innate tendencies and the personalities and situational constraints of their caregivers. Cognitively and affectively, children reorganize continuously throughout development, as we do throughout our lives. Yet every decision that works—that solves a problem of adaptation, lends order where previously there was subjective disorder, or regulates an affect—becomes a conservative dynamic, a schema in the Piagetian sense. Often, however, cognitive, affective, and motivational “decisions” that resist accommodation prevent psychological development along different pathways. A child who learns to fear intimacy in his interactions with his avoidant/dismissing mother is likely to bring his characteristic working models of self and relationships, along with the motives and affect-regulatory strategies associated with them, into other relationships. This in turn constrains the reactions of others and the consequent feedback that might disconfirm expectations and challenge procedures that are maladaptive or at least nonoptimal.

Humans are also born into bodies. Our feelings, wishes, fears, and representations of self are, from the start, tied to our physical existence. And physical experiences are frequently linked to emotionally salient interpersonal encounters. The nurturant touch of a caretaker, or the gleam in a proud parent’s eyes, is an intensely pleasurable experience. It is natural—and perhaps naturally selected—that children would at times want to be the only apple of their parent’s eyes and would wish they could eliminate the competition—even though they may also be deeply attached to the competitors for their parent’s love. Requirements to control one’s body—to eat on schedule, to defecate in particular places at particular times, or to sit at a desk for hours at a day in school—begin early in life and cannot avoid creating conflicts of obedience versus disobedience or identification with respected others versus pursuit of one’s own desires. And with the development of full-blown sexual wishes at puberty, children must negotiate a remarkably complex process of directing sexual and loving feelings toward particular others and avoiding sexual feelings toward some who are loved, with whom mating would be biologically disadvantageous—all without the aid of conscious attention. An affective aversion to incest is probably one more example of “prepared” emotional potentialities—in this case, a spontaneous feeling of disgust—that render certain associations between affects and representations more likely than others, just as humans and other animals
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are more likely to associate nausea with tastes than with sounds (on taste and nausea, see Garcia & Koelling, 1966).

Humans, like all other primates, are social animals, for whom survival and reproduction require considerable good will from others, including caretakers, family, potential mates, friends, and coalition partners. Most of our wishes can only be attained interpersonally, which means that much of life involves an external negotiation with significant others to adjudicate and balance conflicting desires and an internal negotiation among competing feelings and motives associated with those we care about or need. From birth, our survival depends on the benevolence of others whose subjectivity and individuality we scarcely understand. For the young child, caretaking others are a given—ground, not figure—and their help, nurturance, and selflessness is expected and generally unacknowledged. At the same time, these important people in our lives invariably frustrate us, because they have competing needs and demands on their time and energy, because as young children we have only a limited understanding of their thoughts and motives, and because their own imperfections often lead them to respond in ways that are emotionally destructive. Thus, the fundamental templates for our later social representations are always ambivalent—associated with love and hate—which is why there is no one who can elicit our anger or aggression more than the ones we most love.

These templates—internal working models of the self, relationships, and others; wishes, fears, and emotions associated with them; and modes of relating and regulating affects—are by no means unalterable or monolithic. From early in life, children develop multiple working models even of the same caregiver, and they form significant relationships with siblings and others in their environment that establish templates for future relationships. Once again, however, it is important to bear in mind that routinized cognitive, affective, and affect-regulatory “decisions” can not only foster development, by directing behavior in adaptive directions selected through learning, but also derail it, as they lock people into patterns maintained by avoidance of consciously or unconsciously feared alternatives, or lead them to behave in ways that lead to confirmation of their beliefs and fears (Wachtel, 1997).

This is just an outline of what an evolutionarily influenced psychodynamic model of personality might look like, but we believe it is an important start. In any case, psychoanalytic theorists would do well in the future to weigh evolutionary considerations whenever they propose theories of motivation, development, or personality, because personality processes, like other psychological processes, likely bear the clear imprint of natural selection.

DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

True to our stripes as psychoanalytically oriented clinicians and personality psychologists, we are probably better at interpreting the past than at predicting future behavior, so we describe only briefly here what we believe to be four directions that psychoanalysis, and psychoanalytic approaches to personality in particular, will (and, we think, must) take in the future. Either our prognostic skills were characteristically accurate or our schemas are rigid, because these are essentially the same as those we proposed in the last edition of this handbook.

An Expanded Empiricism and the End of Splendid Isolation

As we have seen, many prominent analysts are now calling for psychoanalysis to upgrade its credentials as an empirical science. As suggested above, this process is in some respects already underway, although it is considerably obstructed by many institutional processes both within psychoanalysis (such as a disregard for, or indifference to, experimental work among many analysts, and a lack of research training at psychoanalytic institutes) and within academic psychology departments (such as disrespect for clinical data, a general suspicion or dismissal of psychoanalytic ideas, and a decreasing presence of psychodynamically oriented faculty in clinical psychology programs).

Examination of Microstructures and Processes

Perhaps the most important contribution of a mind like Freud’s or Piaget’s is to pose big questions and big solutions. The historian H. R. Trevor-Roper once said something to the effect that the function of a genius is not to provide answers, but to pose questions that time and mediocrity will resolve. Freud, like Piaget, drew the big picture, and proposed broad stages and
structures that could account for an astonishing array of observable phenomena.

Scientific progress seems to require a dialectic not only between abstract theory and detailed observation, but also between the holistic purview of thinkers such as Freud and Piaget and the more atomistic view characteristic of most academic psychology, at least in North America. The time is overdue in psychoanalysis for a move toward exploration of microprocesses, just as researchers in cognitive development have moved toward mapping the specific processes involved in cognitive development that produce some of the phenomena Piaget observed and carrying out the painstaking work of refining and eliminating inadequate aspects of his theoretical superstructure (Brainerd, 1978; Case, 1992; Flavell, 1992; Fischer & Bidell, 1998). Whereas the psychoanalytic assessment of personality today largely involves assessment of level of object relations, level of ego functioning, and dynamic conflicts, assessment in the future will require a much more differentiated understanding of each of those domains.

For example, when theorists speak of “internalized object relations” or “internalization of the mother,” it is often difficult to know precisely what they mean. Frequently notions of internalization rely upon Freud’s antiquated copy theory of perception (Schimek, 1975), as if somehow children store veridical percepts of important objects alongside their fantasy constructions. Equally problematic are classical analytic models of internalization that view the “taking in” of objects as some kind of act of oral incorporation.

One can, in fact, distinguish several legitimate but distinct ways in which one can speak of internalization:

1. Formation of a person schema or object representation, with or without access to consciousness
2. Formation of a relationship schema—that is, a representation of a relationship or set of relationships, with or without access to consciousness
3. Formation of dynamic relationship paradigms and object-related fantasies—that is, cognitive-affective structures linking interpersonal wishes and fears with representations and action tendencies, and motivating interpersonal behavior—again, which may be conscious or unconscious
4. Various forms of procedural knowledge, in which the individual learns to relate in particular ways, expects to feel particular things in relationships, or learns to regulate affect in relationships, typically without consciousness of these processes
5. Modeling, in which the person develops the competence to imitate some aspect of another’s behavior
6. Internalization of function, in which functions previously carried out by an external object become self-regulating functions, such as self-soothing in the face of pain or threat, and do not necessarily entail representation of specific people
7. Moral internalization, in which moral injunctions become valued or emotionally invested in as moral ideals
8. Identification narrowly defined, which combines formation of an object representation, modeling and behavioral imitation, establishment of a motivational structure of “ideal object” to emulate, and adjustment of the self-concept or specific self-representations to reflect the altered ideal and behavior.

As can be seen, these various processes are not isomorphic. Any theorist who wishes to speak coherently of internalization of objects or internalized object relations must be able to specify precisely which processes he or she means in a particular instance.

**Attention to Activating Conditions**

Psychoanalysis is above all a dynamic theory, which in its sophisticated forms rarely posits trait-like phenomena that express themselves across all situations. Psychoanalytic research and theories of object relations and the self, however, must be careful to avoid static conceptions of processes, stages, and levels of functioning viewed as always operative (Westen, 1990b). Future psychoanalytic research must pay careful attention to the activating conditions of various processes. We do not know, for example, whether borderline patients are uniformly unable to form relatively rich, differentiated representations of people, or whether they use less mature split representations and make illogical attributions under certain conditions, such as poorly modulated affect or conflicts centered around separation or aggression. In many respects, a renewed emphasis on dynamics leads
both to more classically psychoanalytic conceptions of conflict and compromise, and to contemporary currents in personality psychology focusing on conditions under which personality dispositions can be expected to be expressed, such as Mischel’s if . . . then . . . contingencies (Mischel & Shoda, 1995).

A Cognitive–Affective Theory

Finally, we suspect that a shift that has been occurring since the 1980s will continue, namely that basic theoretical concepts in psychoanalysis will be denoted by terms such as “thoughts,” “feelings,” “wishes,” “actions,” and “compromise formations,” rather than by more obscure terms lacking clear empirical referents, such as “counterphasic,” “symbiotic fusion,” “drive derivative,” and the like.

CONCLUSION

A story is told of a student who asked his mentor, “Professor, what is science?” The professor paused and finally answered, “Science is looking for a black cat in a dark room.” Momentarily satisfied, the student began to walk away, but then another question came to him. “Professor,” he asked, “what is philosophy?” The academic furrowed his brow and after some thought replied, “Philosophy is looking for a black cat in a dark room where there is no black cat.” Once again the student, satisfied that his question was answered, took leave of his mentor, only to return to ask one further question: “Professor, what is psychoanalysis?” “Psychoanalysis,” the professor responded after a moment of deep contemplation, “is looking for a black cat in a dark room where there is no black cat—and finding one anyway.”

Although, we have attempted to show, the cat has actually been there lurking in the dark more often than has been supposed, one can have little doubt that in the history of psychoanalysis, clinicians and theorists have mistaken more than one shadow for substance, and more than one of our own eyelashes for a feline whisker. The alternative, which personality psychologists who rely exclusively on more conservative methods have chosen, is to turn on the light, see what can be seen, and assume that what goes on in the dark is unknowable or unimportant. If psychoanalysis has, and will continue to have, anything to offer the psychology of personality, it is the insight that we need not be in the dark about processes that are not manifestly observable, and that in the shadows sometimes lies the substance.

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NOTES

1. Although, as we will see, Freud’s theory of psychic energy has increasingly fallen into disrepute in psychoanalysis because of the many ways it is problematic (Holt, 1976), certain aspects of it are intuitively appealing and even have empirical support. One is the notion that actively keeping knowledge from oneself may require expenditure of considerable psychic energy, and that this may have both psychological and physiological costs (Shedler, Mayman, & Manis, 1993; Weinberger, 1990).

2. The concept of psychic reality is closely tied to another issue that has come to the fore in the last decade in psychoanalysis, namely the role of actual events, particularly traumatic events, in shaping personality. Although Freud never entirely abandoned the idea that actual childhood seduction was a common and pathogenic phenomenon, he certainly emphasized the role of fantasy in his psychoanalytic writing. Simon (1992) noted that cases of actual incest were remarkably absent from much of the psychoanalytic literature until the decade of the 1980s. More recently, psychoanalytic thought has been heavily influenced by the rediscovery of the relatively high prevalence of incest and other forms of childhood abuse. A by-product of the increased interest in traumatic experiences in childhood has been a widespread controversy about the veridicality of recovered memories in clinical practice. Critics of psychoanalysis (Crews, 1995) have tended to blame Freud for the so-called recovered memory therapists who supposedly encourage patients to believe in the absolute accuracy of memories of childhood seductions. These attacks are based on the assumption that Freud’s model of treatment in the 1890s was never superseded by advances in theory or technique. In fact, Freud abandoned the cathartic abreaction model of de-repressing pathogenic memories before the turn of the century. Indeed, there is great irony in the linkage of recovered memory therapists to Freud, because in actuality he
was the first to recognize the fallibility of recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse (Lear, 1998).

REFERENCES


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THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES


Chaper 3. Psychoanalytic Approaches to Personality


